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ABSTRACT 
     Current approaches to the negotiated resolution of ethnic civil conflict either ignore or 
negate the impact of the content of ethnic identities on the negotiation process, or 
alternatively assume without sufficient evidence that violent conflict is caused by conflicting 
ethnic narratives. Based upon a comparison of the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland 
conflicts and negotiation processes, this thesis suggests a third perspective. While the 
evidence does not support the contention that conflicting ethnic narratives cause violent civil 
conflict to occur, identity-based issues can present tremendous barriers to negotiated 
agreement. The postponement of the central identity-based issue was critical to the success of 
the Northern Ireland peace process, and the inclusion of such issues for permanent resolution 
was equally critical to the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. These findings 
suggest that the postponement of permanently resolving such issues until after the cause of 
conflict is addressed may offer a more promising strategy for ending violent civil conflict 
than alternatives hitherto explored.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
     The negotiated resolution of ethnic civil conflicts
1
 is one of the greatest challenges facing 
the international community in the post-Cold War era.
2
 Yet current approaches either ignore 
or negate the impact of the content of ethnic identities on the negotiation process, or 
alternatively assume without sufficient evidence that violent conflict is caused by conflicting 
ethnic narratives. A new approach to ethnic civil conflict negotiation is therefore needed that 
does not fall into either of these traps. 
     Research indicates that participants in violent political conflicts often react differently 
when asked to make concessions on identity-based issues as opposed to issues unrelated to 
the content of their ethnic identities. It has been demonstrated that rewards and punishments 
do not facilitate concession on these issues as they do with other issues. In fact, the offering 
of material incentives for compromising sacred ethnic values has been shown to backfire, 
often being perceived by leaders and publics as an insult.
3
 This means that the dominant 
rational choice negotiation approach, which assumes that individuals make decisions using a 
cost-benefit analysis, is inappropriate when issues related to the content of ethnic identity are 
involved. This can pose substantial barriers to the achievement of a negotiated settlement. 
     So what is the most successful way to address issues related to the content of ethnic 
identities in civil conflict negotiations? Using the logic that negotiated resolutions should 
address the cause of conflicts, I will determine the cause of two violent civil conflicts 
                                                          
1
 I define a civil conflict as ethnic “if the contending actors or parties identify themselves or one another using 
ethnic criteria.” (Gurr 2000: 65) In turn, I define an ethnic community as “a named human population with a 
myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland 
and a measure of solidarity.” (Smith 1993: 49) 
2
 Zartman (1995b: 332); Lijphart (McGarry and O‟Leary 1995: back cover). 
3
 Ginges et al. (2007); Atran, Axelrod, and Davis (2007). 
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between antagonists with conflicting ethnic narratives. In this thesis, I will conduct a 
historical analysis of the backgrounds to the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts 
and conclude that grossly unequal power relations, rather than conflicting elements of the 
ethnic antagonists‟ identities, was the cause of violent civil conflict. Based upon these 
findings, I will test the hypothesis that the best way to deal with issues related to the content 
of ethnic identities in civil conflict negotiations is to postpone permanent resolution of these 
issues until after power relations have been restructured, as opposed to attempting to 
overcome the identity-based barriers concurrently. In order to test this hypothesis I will 
conduct historical analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland negotiation 
processes, utilize counterfactual analysis, and compare the two cases to each other. I will 
conclude that these two cases support this hypothesis. 
     This thesis will contribute to the literature regarding civil conflict negotiation and the 
content of ethnic identity in two ways. First, I challenge the assumption in the literature that 
conflicting elements of ethnic identity cause the initial outbreak of violent civil conflict. 
Instead, I suggest that the content of ethnic identities merely presents significant barriers to 
negotiated agreement. Following from this revised assumption, I suggest a new method for 
addressing the problems posed by the content of ethnic identities in civil conflict negotiation 
that appears to offer greater possibilities for success than those currently offered. 
     This thesis will proceed as follows. First, I will review the existing literature regarding the 
negotiated resolution of ethnic civil conflict, paying particular attention to the literature that 
addresses the barriers posed by the content of ethnic identities. In order to address the 
fundamental shortcoming of the existing literature, I will review the content of the ethnic 
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identities of the antagonists in the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts and then 
examine the histories of these conflicts in order to determine if the conflicting narratives 
explain the occurrence of violent conflict or whether it is better explained by other factors. 
Based upon my findings, I will then examine and compare the Israeli-Palestinian and 
Northern Ireland negotiations in order to determine what identity-based issues were included 
in the agenda for permanent resolution, which were postponed, and what the impact of this 
inclusion or postponement was. I will end with conclusions drawn from my findings and the 
implications for conflict scholars, mediators, and negotiators.
4 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF ETHNIC CIVIL CONFLICT 
     Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has strongly encouraged 
negotiated settlements to civil conflicts.
4
 This has resulted in an expanding literature 
addressing what variables determine the success and failure of peace processes, within which 
the credible commitment theory of civil war resolution has been particularly influential. The 
theory assumes that civil war is the result of government breakdown, which results in a 
security dilemma and the outbreak of war.
5
 As a result, it is assumed that combatants, 
whether ethnically defined or not, will be unwilling to enter into the highly vulnerable period 
of demobilization of partisan armies that is necessary when rebuilding a unified state unless 
credible guarantees are offered by third parties on the terms of the settlement.
6
 While a useful 
explanation for why ethnic civil conflict negotiations succeed or fail in the many cases of 
conflict that result from state failure, the credible commitment theory is insufficient for 
explaining the outcome of negotiations in cases where conflict is the result of additional 
factors and it ignores the presence of identity-based barriers to conflict resolution. 
     Another valuable explanation for the success or failure of civil conflict negotiations 
focuses on the ability to reach power-sharing agreements. States with distinct ethnic or 
ideological cleavages, referred to as deeply divided societies, have been shown to be 
particularly prone to civil conflict if power is concentrated within one or more dominant 
                                                          
4
 Licklider (1995: 681). 
5
 Walter and Snyder, ed. (1999). Other explanations for violent civil conflict focus on the role of predatory 
leaders seeking to maintain power as the cause of the security dilemma rather than state collapse (De Figueiredo 
and Weingast 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2000). As these explanations would require new leaders in addition to 
third party security guarantees on implementation, they have no clear prescription for negotiated resolution. 
Therefore, I will not be considering these theories in this thesis. 
6
 Walter (1997, 2002); Walter and Snyder, ed. 
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groups while other groups are marginalized.
7
 Two alternative solutions can rectify power 
inequalities in deeply divided states, these being the creation of power-sharing arrangements 
within a unified government
8
 or territorial partition into separate sovereign states.
9
 The 
attention paid to the restructuring of power relations between groups is particularly valuable 
since many civil conflicts occur when oppressed groups revolt against dominant groups 
despite the lack of state failure, but this theory still fails to address the barriers created by the 
content of ethnic groups‟ identities. 
     Some scholars have suggested that civil conflict can result when the identity content, or 
narratives, of two or more ethnic groups within a state are directly contradictory.
10
 Therefore, 
in order to resolve civil conflicts in these cases one or more of the ethnic groups must make 
concessions on issues that are central to their identity. But while promises of reward and 
threats of punishment by negotiation mediators have been shown to induce concessions in 
ordinary circumstances,
11
 the use of rewards and punishments is ineffective and even 
counterproductive when applied to issues central to the identities of ethnic groups.
12
 
However, certain tactics have been shown to facilitate concessions on emotional identity-
based issues, at least in experimental settings. One promising technique is to devise equitable 
trade-offs of identity-based issues between the parties.
13
 Concessions on identity-based issues 
may also be facilitated when credible ethnic leaders are able to guide their societies through a 
reinterpretation of what important cultural values mean, emphasize one important ethnic 
                                                          
7
 Lijphart (1977). 
8
 Lijphart (1977, 1985); Norris (2008). 
9
 Kaufmann (1999). 
10
 Kaufman (2001, 2006a); Ginges et al.; Atran, Axelrod, and Davis; Atran and Axelrod (2008). 
11
 Zartman and Berman (1982: 180-181). 
12
 Ginges et al. 
13
 Ibid.; Atran, Axelrod, and Davis. 
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value over another, demonstrate respect for the other society‟s important ethnic values and 
narrative, renounce past offensive statements, and issue sincere apologies for past 
wrongdoings that reinforce the other side‟s central ethnic values.14 It is also suggested that 
reconciliation initiatives involving each side‟s ethnic public can increase the potential for 
negotiators to make concessions on identity-based issues. These reconciliation initiatives can 
include problem-solving workshops, cultural events and media initiatives, and the reform of 
educational materials that promote hostility towards members of the opposing group.
15
 
However, the evidence offered to support the utility of reconciliation initiatives has been 
particularly anecdotal. All authors concede the difficulty of applying any of these techniques, 
but still insist upon their great potential to resolve these most difficult issues. 
     Theories of negotiated civil conflict resolution that focus on the content of ethnic 
identities have made a valuable contribution in that they have convincingly demonstrated that 
identity-based issues are more resistant to compromise settlement than other issues. 
However, these theories have not provided sufficient evidence to support their claim that 
conflicting ethnic narratives are actually the cause of conflict. Some of these theories simply 
assume that because parties have had extreme difficulties negotiating these issues that they 
are the cause of violent conflict,
16
 while other studies that support this assumption essentially 
ignore the possibility that serious power inequalities between ethnic groups sharing a single 
polity may have caused the examined conflicts.
17
 If conflicting ethnic narratives actually do 
cause violent civil conflict then resolving them through negotiation would require altering the 
                                                          
14
 Kaufman (2006b); Atran and Axelrod. 
15
 Kaufman (2006b). 
16
 Ginges et al.; Atran, Axelrod, and Davis; Atran and Axelrod. 
17
 Kaufman (2001, 2006a). 
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content of ethnic identity as recommended by these theories. However, if these narratives do 
not actually cause the conflict under consideration then successfully ending the violence may 
not require these difficult changes. Therefore, in order to determine the best way to deal with 
the content of ethnic identities in negotiation, a closer examination of the cause of violent 
civil conflict in cases where conflicting ethnic narratives are found is needed.
8 
 
CHAPTER 3: CASE SELECTION 
     As I am interested in determining both the cause of ethnic civil conflict and the best 
approach for dealing with deeply held identity-based values in civil conflict negotiations, I 
will limit my examination to cases of ethnic civil conflict that attempted negotiated 
settlements where it is well documented that directly conflicting ethnic narratives were 
present prior to the outbreak of violent conflict and during the subsequent negotiation 
processes. Although a comprehensive examination of all such cases would be optimal, I will 
limit my examination to two cases in order to make completion of this thesis feasible within 
the given time constraints within which I am working. 
     For my first case, I have selected the favorite case of scholars who hold conflicting ethnic 
narratives responsible for violent civil conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
18
 While these 
scholars have done an excellent job demonstrating that Jewish Israelis and Palestinians had 
conflicting narratives, there has been little to no evidence presented in these analyses that 
contradictory values were the cause of violent conflict. If the conflicting ethnic narratives 
explanation for violent civil conflict is valuable, it should at least prove valid in explaining its 
proponents‟ favorite case. As the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process was a response to the 
stalemate experienced between the parties in the Intifada that broke out in December 1987,
19
 
I will ask the question of what caused the Intifada to occur before analyzing the negotiation 
process that followed it. 
     For my second case, I have selected an ethnic civil conflict with opposing narratives that 
has received far less attention by proponents of the theory whose validity I am assessing, 
                                                          
18
 Kaufman (2006b); Ginges et al.; Atran, Axelrod, and Davis. 
19
 Morris (2001: 692); Khalidi (2006: 198). 
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Northern Ireland, although it has been noted that examination of it would be highly 
valuable.
20
 Scholars of the conflict have asserted that the opposing ethnic antagonists, Irish 
Catholics and Ulster Protestants, had contradictory narratives.
21
 As the Northern Ireland 
negotiation process was a result of the stalemate experienced by the parties in the Troubles 
that broke out in 1969, I will ask the question of what caused the Troubles to occur before 
analyzing the negotiation process that followed it. While the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern 
Ireland conflicts were both violent ethnic civil conflicts where the opposing parties had 
directly conflicting narratives, as will later be seen, their negotiation processes differed in 
whether they included for permanent resolution or postponed issues related to their 
conflicting ethnic values. Therefore, a comparison of these cases may prove highly useful. 
     In what follows, I will outline the narratives of the ethnic groups in each conflict in order 
to determine what elements of the content of their identities were in direct conflict. In order 
to determine the most important elements of each party‟s ethnic narrative and the culturally 
specific values that were central to their collective identities at the time of the outbreak of the 
violent conflicts under consideration and during their peace processes, I will look to the 
sources of identity transmission, particularly the educational system,
22
 national holidays and 
commemorations,
23
 ethnic rituals,
24
 monuments, historic sites, and museums,
25
 cultural 
                                                          
20
 Kaufman (2006a: 56). 
21
 Arthur (1980: 15); McGarry and O‟Leary, 264. 
22
 Gellner (1983); Anderson (1983). 
23
 Gillis, ed. (1994). 
24
 Hobsbawm and Ranger, ed. (1983). 
25
 Anderson (1991); Gillis, ed. 
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organizations,
26
 published printed materials,
27
 radio, television, film, and music,
28
 and public 
and popular art.
29
 
     I will rely primarily on secondary sources for two reasons. First, an analysis of each 
party‟s ethnic identity using primary sources alone would require the understanding of 
languages I am not adequately familiar with, access to documents that I could not easily 
obtain, and an amount of time that I do not have at my disposal. Second, studies of the 
content of the ethnic identities of the groups under examination in this thesis have already 
been conducted using primary sources. An examination using primary sources would 
therefore be unnecessary and redundant. That being said, I will supplement these secondary 
sources with primary sources where appropriate. 
Case 1: Israel-Palestine 
The Content of Jewish Israeli Identity
 30
 
     During the period under consideration, Jewish Israelis were those citizens of Israel that 
were Jewish according to Halakha (Jewish religious law), which stipulated that one becomes 
a Jew upon birth to a Jewish mother or through formal conversion.
31
 Although Jewish Israeli 
identity was religiously defined, observance was not a necessary component in determining 
group membership and much of the content of Jewish Israeli identity was derived from 
Jewish historical experience and mythology rather than theology. Three fundamental 
                                                          
26
 Cohen (1969). 
27
 Anderson (1983). 
28
 Price (1995). 
29
 Sherman and Rogoff (1994). 
30
 Although there were other significant ethnic groups within Israel proper, including Palestinians (Israeli 
Arabs), Druze, Bedouins, and Circassians, none of the political parties that participated in Israeli governing 
coalitions paid meaningful attention to these non-dominant groups and the state‟s symbols all stressed Israel‟s 
Jewish identity (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003: 179, 185). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis it is not 
necessary to consider the interests and narratives of these groups when examining Israeli identity. 
31
 Cohen (1999: 198-238, 263-307). 
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components of Jewish Israeli identity existed during the relevant time period. These were the 
need for maintaining the existence of the Jewish state, sovereignty over holy Jerusalem, and 
control over the Land of Israel. 
The Jewish State 
     Within Jewish Israeli discourse, three main arguments were given for the intense 
importance of maintaining Israel‟s status as a Jewish state during the time preceding the 
outbreak of the Intifada and during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. These three 
justifications were transmitted to Jewish Israelis through the educational system, various 
communications media, a collection of government sponsored museums and historical sites, 
social and religious organizations, official rituals, and national symbols. 
     The most important justification for the necessity of maintaining Jewish statehood was as 
a defense against persecution and genocide, fears that were based upon historical Jewish 
experience. This was the initial argument that was made by the secular Jewish thinkers that 
spurred the Zionist movement,
32
 and it became even more intensely ingrained in Jewish 
Israeli thinking after the Holocaust.
33
 The Israeli government created an official lesson of the 
Holocaust, that the six million murdered Jews could have been saved had the State of Israel 
existed beforehand, and that the Jewish state must be preserved in order to ensure that such a 
catastrophe never befalls the Jewish people again. The imparting of this official lesson was 
achieved through the national school curriculum
34
 and Israel‟s national Holocaust museum, 
Yad Vashem.
35
 Repeated wars and verbal threats of genocide from various Arab leaders, 
                                                          
32
 See Hess (1862); Pinsker (1882); Herzl (1896). 
33
 Khalidi (2006: 183). 
34
 Raz-Krakotzkin (2003: 166-168). 
35
 Segev (1993: 444). 
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particularly preceding the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also played an instrumental role in 
maintaining Jewish Israeli fears.
36
 
     The second argument given for the maintenance of the Jewish state was the existence of 
the ancient Jewish kingdom in the Land of Israel in antiquity. This narrative gave 
justification to Jewish colonization and the displacement of the Palestinians, as it was 
depicted as a return to the homeland that is rightfully theirs.
37
 This narrative was transmitted 
through the school system,
38
 the national anthem,
39
 the state‟s national museum, the Israel 
Museum,
40
 media coverage of government sponsored archeological digs,
41
 prominent 
national historical sites, and official rituals.
42
 
     The third factor explaining the importance of Israel‟s status as a Jewish state was specific 
to the religious-Zionist subculture of Jewish Israelis. To this community, the Jewish state was 
depicted as an instrument that plays an indispensible role in the fulfillment of biblical 
prophecy. The mass return of Jews to the Land of Israel, the establishment of the state, and 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War were all seen as attesting to the Jewish state‟s role in bringing the 
messianic era, and the Jewish state is to play a necessary role in the future unfolding of this 
drama. This narrative was transmitted through the religious-Zionist school system, religious-
Zionist synagogues, the Bnei Akiva youth movement, the Yeshivot Hesder which combined 
military service and religious study, and through several publications and media outlets.
43
 
                                                          
36
 Zerubavel (1995: 192); Morris (2001: 309-311). 
37
 Zerubavel, 15-26. 
38
 Raz-Krakotzkin, 158-159. 
39
 Imber (1878). 
40
 Israel Museum (2009). 
41
 Zerubavel, 59. 
42
 Ibid., 60-70, 114-31. 
43
 Lustick (1988). 
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     In sum, before the outbreak of the Intifada and at the time of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, the value of the continued existence of the Jewish state was central to the identity of 
Jewish Israelis. The need for its continued existence was essentially unchallenged across the 
political spectrum. 
Jerusalem 
     The importance of Jerusalem to Jewish Israelis in the period under consideration was 
derived from the city‟s significance in Judaism and Jewish history.44 During the period 
preceding the outbreak of the Intifada and through the subsequent negotiation process, the 
necessity of maintaining Israeli control over the holy city was a central Jewish Israeli value 
that was transmitted primarily through various media channels, visitation to national and 
religious sites, and national ceremonies and commemorations. 
     The inability of Jews to access the city‟s holy sites and the intentional damage done to 
them during the period of Jordanian control from 1948 to 1967 dramatically increased the 
significance of Israeli sovereignty over the area after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
45
 The 
conquest of holy Jerusalem in 1967, especially the presumed site of the two Jewish Temples 
known as the Temple Mount, was immortalized as a defining moment in Israeli history and 
added to the importance of retaining control over the city‟s religious sites.46 
     The Western Wall, regarded by Jews as the only standing remnant of the Second Jewish 
Temple, became a major religious and national site after 1967 with renewed prayer and 
frequent and well publicized military ceremonies conducted there.
47
 The attachment to 
                                                          
44
 For a background to the significance of Jerusalem in Judaism and Jewish history, see Armstrong (1998). 
45
 Friedland and Hecht (1996: 33, 45); Kemp and Pressman (1997: 44). 
46
 Sheleff (2001: 297); Rubinger and Corman (2007: 122-124). 
47
 Friedland and Hecht, 180. 
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Jerusalem was also increased by highly publicized archeological excavations that unearthed 
remnants of ancient Jewish history in the city. The area that was thought by archeologists to 
be the actual location of ancient Jewish Jerusalem, outside of the Old City in the modern 
Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan, became an important national site known to Israelis as 
the City of David.
48
 An annual national holiday, Yom Yerushalayim (Jerusalem Day), was 
also created to celebrate the unification of Jerusalem under Israeli control. A highly 
nationalistic parade through the Old City was the centerpiece of the commemoration.
49
 Music 
and literature celebrating Jerusalem also proliferated after 1967.
50
 Jerusalem thus became a 
central symbol to the identity of both religious and entirely secular Israeli Jews.
51
 
     Before the outbreak of the Intifada and during the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process, 
the importance of maintaining control over holy Jerusalem (meaning the Old City, especially 
the Temple Mount, Western Wall, and Jewish Quarter, the City of David, and the Mount of 
Olives cemetery) was so strong and central to Jewish Israeli identity that only 17 percent of 
Israeli Jews polled in 1993 were even willing to discuss the issue in negotiations.
52
 Even in 
exchange for a full and lasting peace, 96 percent of Israeli Jews polled opposed giving up 
sovereign control over the Western Wall and 89 percent rejected forfeiture of the Temple 
Mount.
53
 In sum, control over holy Jerusalem was a central component of Jewish Israeli 
identity before the outbreak of the Intifada and during the peace process. 
                                                          
48
 Zerubavel, 186; Friedland and Hecht, 43, 436. 
49
 Greenberg (1998). 
50
 Amichai (1973, 1988); Schenker (1993: 51). 
51
 Shur (1993: 6); Agassi (1993: 10); Gold (1993: 48); Zerubavel, 125; Armstrong (1998: 7); Enderlin (2002: 
282-283). 
52
 Arian (1993: 9); Friedland and Hecht, 444, 469, 488-489. 
53
 Shragai (2007). Although conducted after the period under consideration, this 2007 poll is very revealing in 
regards to the permissibility of concessions over Jerusalem‟s central Jewish Israeli symbols. 
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The Land of Israel 
     For a significant minority of the Jewish Israeli public prior to the outbreak of the Intifada 
and during the subsequent negotiation process, Israeli control over the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) was far more than a preference that could be compensated for by incentives 
such as security guarantees and financial compensation or decreased by diplomatic pressure. 
Especially for the minority of Jewish Israelis who adhered to the religious-Zionist ideology, 
Israeli control over the entirety of the Land of Israel amounted to a sacred value. As has 
already been mentioned, the religious-Zionist movement transmitted its belief system 
through its schools, synagogues, youth movement, military program, and several publications 
and media outlets.
54
 
     The religious-Zionist movement only grew to critical importance following the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. As a consequence of the war, Israel controlled Judaism‟s most significant 
lands, including holy Jerusalem, Hebron, and the whole of Judea and Samaria (the West 
Bank). As religious-Zionists believed that the Jewish messiah would arrive after Jewish rule 
is established over the entire biblically defined Land of Israel,
55
 the increase in control over 
holy territory was seen as supporting the ideology‟s foundational beliefs. A significant 
increase in adherents of the religious-Zionist philosophy occurred as a result.
56
 
     The dominant view within the religious-Zionist movement at the time under consideration 
was that Israeli control over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights must be made 
permanent. Opposition to withdrawal from any of the Land of Israel was extremely strong as 
                                                          
54
 Lustick (1988). 
55
 Although there were theological disputes over the precise dimensions of the Land of Israel, the Nile and 
Euphrates Rivers were generally seen as the western and eastern borders (Ibid., 104-110). 
56
 Ibid., 29. 
16 
 
it was seen as contradicting God‟s desire for the Jews to inherit the land and delaying 
messianic redemption. Proposed compromises were depicted as tests of the Jewish people‟s 
faith and commitment that must be rejected for redemption to move forward. Agreement was 
essentially universal that Arabs have no rights over any part of the Land of Israel.
57
 A 
particularly violent fringe of the religious-Zionist movement also existed during the period 
under consideration. These extreme activists had carried out attacks on Arabs and left-wing 
Zionists, and were more willing to find religious justifications for killing Jews thought to 
create a sufficient threat to their goals.
58
 
     In sum, control over the entire Land of Israel was central to the identity of a significant 
minority of Israeli Jews during the period preceding the Intifada and during the peace process 
that followed. Exact measures of how widespread this value was are not available, but some 
estimation is possible. In 1975, thirty percent of Israeli Jews polled responded that they 
would not be willing to concede any of the West Bank for peace.
59
 
The Content of Palestinian Identity 
     During the relevant period, Palestinians were defined as “those Arab nationals who, until 
1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have 
stayed there” and those born subsequently to a Palestinian father.60 Palestinian identity was 
therefore based upon the Arabic language and the borders of British Mandate Palestine, but 
Islam also played a crucial role in the identity as the vast majority of Palestinians were 
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Muslims.
61
 Three central components of Palestinian identity existed during the period of 
interest. These were the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their ancestral homes within 
Israel, sovereignty over holy Jerusalem, and the reclaiming of all of historic Palestine. 
Right of Return 
     The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was seen as a disaster by Palestinians, whether 
they became refugees or remained in their homes in what became Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. 
The events were enshrined in Palestinian collective memory as al-Nakba (the catastrophe).
62
 
The most potent aspect of this shared trauma for Palestinians was the uprooting of 
approximately 700,000
63
 Palestinians from their homes, subsequently forbidden by the Israeli 
government to return.
64
 The Nakba served as the central formative experience of Palestinian 
identity,
65
 and the call for a right of return was an essentially unquestioned demand of the 
Palestinians during the period under consideration.
66
 
     In the years following al-Nakba, there was a great proliferation of Palestinian literature, 
artwork, and music that expressed the themes of the injustice done to the refugees and their 
desire to return to their homes.
67
 This work was subsequently featured in Palestinian schools 
and in all forms of modern media
68
 and played a critical role in transmitting to young 
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Palestinian refugees, who themselves had no firsthand experience of the events,
69
 their sacred 
duty of returning and undoing this great injustice.
70
 Firsthand storytelling and refugee camp 
life also reinforced the centrality of the idea of return.
71
 The house key became the most 
important symbolic representation of the desire to return, and a tradition was created of 
passing it from generation to generation along with property deeds.
72
 A Palestinian refugee 
tradition was also cultivated of secondhand refugees identifying themselves as being from the 
birthplace in Palestine of the original refugee that they were descended from.
73
 The right of 
return did not imply just a yearning to return to Palestine, but rather to the specific village 
and home where the firsthand refugee once lived.
74
 
     In a survey of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon 
over 95 percent of respondents demanded that Israel accept the right of each individual 
refugee to decide for him or herself whether or not to return.
75
 Experiments also 
demonstrated that when presented with peace settlements violating the right of return, the 
overwhelming majority of Palestinian refugees surveyed responded with greater anger when 
financial compensation was given in addition.
76
 This provides clear evidence that the right of 
return exhibited the characteristics of a sacred ethnic value, at least for Palestinian refugees. 
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Jerusalem 
     The importance of Jerusalem in Palestinian identity during the period under consideration 
was derived from the city‟s importance in Islam and the prevalence of Islam amongst 
Palestinians.
77
 The Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary), containing al-Aqsa (the Farthest) 
Mosque and the Qubbat al-Sakhra (Dome of the Rock) shrine, was considered Islam‟s third 
holiest site.
78
 The significance of the Haram al-Sharif, which occupied the same physical 
space as what Jews considered to be the Temple Mount, was derived from its association 
with the Koranic narrative of Muhammad‟s Night Journey, the Isra, and Ascent, the Mi’raj.79 
The entirety of the walled Old City of Jerusalem and its environs were of secondary 
importance. 
     Although already considered holy, the significance of Jerusalem to Palestinian Muslims 
increased as a result of Israeli control of the Old City and its Islamic holy sites after 1967.
80
 
Palestinians often accused Israel of “Judaizing” the city and plotting to destroy the Islamic 
structures in order to build a Jewish Temple in its place.
81
 The importance of Islam in 
Palestinian politics also increased after 1967. As Israel cracked down on secular Palestinian 
nationalists in the OPT, the Muslim Brotherhood delivered a distinctly religious-nationalist 
message from their broad network of mosques with relative impunity. The importance of 
liberating Jerusalem, and especially the Haram al-Sharif, from control by non-Muslims was a 
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central component of the sermons. As religious observance rates steadily increased in the 
OPT during the occupation, the importance of holy Jerusalem in Palestinian identity 
increased.
82
 
     The Dome of the Rock served as a prominent symbol of Palestinian aspirations after 1967 
and was featured conspicuously in all forms of artwork. Representations of the Dome were 
an almost universal feature in Palestinian Muslim homes, and the image proliferated in urban 
graffiti. Use of religious themes was not limited to the Islamist political organizations; Yasser 
Arafat‟s Fatah party used Islamic symbolism and the imagery of the Haram al-Sharif 
extensively to mobilize the Palestinian masses in the 1980s as well. The Palestine Liberation 
Organization‟s (PLO) November 15, 1988 declaration of Palestinian independence explicitly 
stated that holy Jerusalem was the capital of the Palestinian state. Jerusalem‟s religious sites 
were therefore central symbols for secular Palestinians just as they were for their Jewish 
Israeli counterparts.
83
 
     Although no credible polling data exists on the subject for the period under consideration, 
scholars were in general agreement that control over Jerusalem‟s Islamic holy sites was a 
nonnegotiable issue that was central to the identity of the overwhelming majority of 
Palestinians. For religious Palestinian Muslims, any voluntary forfeiture of the Haram al-
Sharif was also seen as a repudiation of Islam.
84
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Historic Palestine 
     The reclaiming of all of historic Palestine was of intense importance to the identity of 
much of the Palestinian population during the period of interest. Although once a central 
tenet of Palestinian identity, it is not entirely clear how widespread this value was before the 
outbreak of the Intifada and during the peace process. Much of this confusion is the product 
of this aspiration being expressed in several ways, some of which were distinctly more 
discreet than others. 
     In the most straightforward form, some Palestinians refused even temporary territorial 
compromise with Israel. This orthodox Palestinian position was termed rejectionism.
85
 The 
PLO charter, adopted in 1968, clearly expressed this perspective.
86
 The rejection of Israel‟s 
legitimacy rested heavily on the depiction of the Zionist movement as a colonial enterprise 
that served Western imperial interests.
87
 The PLO‟s strategy gradually evolved though, and it 
adopted a phased approach to reclaiming all of historic Palestine in 1974. As a result, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other factions left the organization 
to form the Rejectionist Front which carried on the orthodox Palestinian perspective.
88
 
     The rejectionist perspective was also justified on Islamic religious-nationalist grounds. 
Hamas, founded in 1987, was the most important movement representing this perspective, 
but activity in the OPT by the Muslim Brotherhood predated its founding. Islamic Jihad, 
founded in Gaza in 1980, and other smaller factions also shared the same fundamental 
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beliefs.
89
 The foundational tenet of these groups was that all of Palestine is an Islamic waqf 
(religious trust) of which no part can be forfeited.
90
 Hamas‟ charter declared that “renouncing 
any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion.”91 The ideology of these Islamic-
nationalist groups was transmitted to Palestinian Muslims through a substantial network of 
affiliated mosques, especially in the Gaza Strip.
92
 
     The aspiration for reclaiming all of historic Palestine was also expressed in more subtle 
terms than the strict rejectionist stance. One of these approaches was to advocate for a single 
democratic state in all of historic Palestine where Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal voting 
rights. The clear intention though was domination by a Palestinian majority rather than any 
form of power-sharing.
93
 The other approaches to reclaiming all of historic Palestine were 
even more subtle in that they gave the appearance of accepting Israel‟s existence. The first of 
these was the approach that was introduced by the PLO in 1974, the regaining of all of 
Palestine in stages. Many Palestinians also sought to turn Israel into a majority Palestinian 
state through an unlimited application of the right of return.
94
 
     Because it was possible to uphold the belief that the reclaiming of all of Palestine is 
essential while not adopting the orthodox rejectionist stance, it is particularly difficult to 
gauge how widespread this value was during the relevant period. Polling data indicates that a 
strong majority of Palestinians supported a two-state solution to the conflict,
95
 but does not 
differentiate between those committed to living beside Israel as a permanent solution and 
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those who viewed it as temporary, or those who envisioned an unrestricted right of return 
rendering Israel a second Palestinian state. Meaningful polling data regarding this value is 
therefore not available. Statements by leading PLO officials
96
 and a noted Palestinian 
scholar
97
 seem to indicate that the eventual regaining of the entire Palestinian homeland was 
an essential component of Palestinian identity for an overwhelming majority. Without polling 
data, however, this is only speculation. It has been estimated that the orthodox rejectionist 
perspective was held by a significant minority of Palestinians at the time under 
consideration.
98
 In sum, it can safely be concluded that the necessity of reclaiming of all of 
historic Palestine was a central belief for a substantial proportion of the Palestinian public. 
Conflicting Elements of Identity in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
     There were several elements of the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian narratives which directly 
conflicted. The Jewish Israeli value of maintaining a Jewish state conflicted with the 
Palestinian aspirations for a right of return and the reclaiming of historic Palestine. The 
narratives of the two sides regarding Jerusalem were clearly in conflict as both claimed that 
control of the same holy site, the Temple Mount for Israeli Jews and the Haram al-Sharif for 
Palestinian Muslims, was central to their identity. The minority Jewish Israeli belief in the 
necessity of maintaining control over all portions of the Land of Israel occupied by the state 
of Israel contradicted both the Palestinian aspirations for control over holy Jerusalem and the 
reclaiming of historic Palestine, and perhaps more importantly conflicted with any scenario 
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in which Palestinians would have sole or shared control over any part of Israel, the West 
Bank, or the Gaza Strip. 
Case 2: Northern Ireland 
The Content of Irish Catholic Identity 
     Within Northern Ireland, the label Catholic denoted an ethnic group indentified by 
religious affiliation and not necessarily belief. Catholicism served as the clearest marker of 
the native Irish population, and the discrimination and repression faced on the basis of 
religion over the centuries of colonial rule and subsequently at the hands of Ulster Protestant 
unionists within Northern Ireland cemented the importance of religious identity in 
distinguishing the two ethnic communities in the province and on the island.
99
 The two ethnic 
groups in Northern Ireland overwhelmingly married within their own group, lived separately, 
were educated separately, patronized separate local businesses, and, most importantly, 
adhered to different political ideologies.
100
 
United Ireland 
     The central identity-based value that united Irish Catholics during the period under 
consideration was the aspiration of achieving a united island of Ireland under Irish political 
control. Although Irish Catholics often pointed to the past existence of Protestant Irish 
nationalists to claim that theirs is a civic nationalist movement and not sectarian,
101
 the fact 
remains that in the time preceding the Troubles and during the subsequent peace process 
electoral support for Irish nationalism was almost entirely restricted within the island of 
Ireland to Catholics and its symbolism had an ethnic orientation. Whether individuals 
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espoused civic or ethnic nationalism and endorsed violent or nonviolent strategies, the goal 
of Irish unity was a constant amongst this ethnic group.
102
 
     The transmission of this value to Irish Catholics was achieved in several ways. Children 
were indoctrinated through the Catholic schools that nearly all Northern Catholic students 
attended. The textbooks used presented students with a highly partisan and emotional 
account of Irish history that stressed the quest for Irish unity. In order to embed students with 
an ethnic Irish identity the Irish language was a critical component of the curriculum. 
Northern Catholic schools also organized traditional Irish sporting activities such as hurling, 
camogie, and handball in coordination with the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). The 
GAA was particularly assertive in using sports to promote an ethnic nationalist agenda with 
Irish unity at its core.
103
 
     The press also served an important role in transmitting the content of ethnic identity to 
Northern Catholics. Newspapers primarily targeted ethnic audiences and gave the Catholic 
community a nationalist interpretation of events in the province and on the island.
104
 During 
the Troubles, Sinn Féin‟s weekly newspaper, An Phoblacht, was particularly assertive in 
portraying the island of Ireland as a unified whole.
105
 
     Another source of identity transmission was through the openly sectarian organization, the 
Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), which stressed the importance of achieving a united 
Ireland. Participation in the AOH was never particularly extensive, but its parades delivered 
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the organization‟s message to a broader audience than its active membership.106 The most 
important parades were those held annually to commemorate the 1916 Easter Rising and 
signify allegiance to the all-Ireland republic declared then.
107
 
     The primary justification for the unity of Ireland was the assertion that the entire island is 
the only appropriate unit of self-determination. Irish Catholic opinion leaders most 
consistently pointed to the results of the 1918 Westminster general election when supporters 
of united independence won 79 of the island‟s 105 seats. This was depicted as the clearest 
demonstration of the will of the people of Ireland, and the island‟s partition thus violated the 
inhabitants‟ democratic choice. This argument was expressed by constitutional nationalist 
parties from both parts of Ireland at the New Ireland Forum in 1984.
108
 
     The vast majority of influential Irish Catholics argued that the entire island of Ireland 
remained the appropriate unit of self-determination even after partition. Irish governments 
frequently made publicized comments in support of this position, most prominently in 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, and it was articulated in numerous pamphlets and 
books regarding the unjust nature of Ireland‟s partition. These pamphlets and books 
consistently made the argument that the entire island of Ireland is the only natural political 
unit, and that the border between North and South is completely artificial and has separated 
Northern Catholics from the rest of their natural community.
109
 
     The belief that the island of Ireland is the appropriate unit of self-determination was even 
expressed in religious terms, such as by Cardinal Joseph MacRory who declared Ireland to be 
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“made one by God.”110 This sentiment was not restricted to the Catholic clergy though, as it 
was also expressed by leading Irish politicians.
111
 The more extreme and militant nationalists, 
known as republicans, also asserted that only one nation exists on the island of Ireland and 
that Ulster Protestants are part of the Irish nation regardless of what they believe. It was 
consequently argued that the Irish nation is entitled to exercise authority over the island‟s 
entirety according to the principle of national self-determination.
112
 
     The second category of arguments made by Irish Catholics for Irish unity revolved around 
the depiction of British sovereignty on the island as colonialism. These arguments were made 
primarily by republicans. It was frequently asserted that Ireland was historically a British 
colony, and according to international law the partition by decolonizing powers of territories 
granted independence is illegal. Northern Ireland was thus seen as an illegitimate colony used 
to serve British imperial interests, and British withdrawal was therefore called for.
113
 As 
republicans vociferously rejected the validity of partition, it was often claimed that the 
Republic of Ireland was spurious as well.
114
 Republicans also frequently argued that Ulster 
Protestants, as the descendants of colonists whose presence on the island was improper, had 
no right to influence Ireland‟s political status.115 
     The centrality of a united Ireland to Irish Catholic identity was not only based in 
resentment of what were perceived as the historical injustices of partition and British 
colonialism. The aspiration for Irish unity was also reinforced by the discriminatory nature of 
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Northern Ireland‟s government and labor market after 1920 and the inability of the British 
government to adequately remedy the situation after the imposition of direct rule in 1972. 
Partisan policing and administration of justice were particularly influential in the 
perpetuation of aspirations to free all of Ireland from British rule.
116
 
     The desire for a united Ireland can be explained much more credibly by the content of 
Irish Catholic identity than by material interests. Northern Catholics earned more than 
workers in the Republic of Ireland despite their relative economic disadvantage within the 
province, and British welfare benefits were clearly superior to those in the South. The 
economic disparity between North and South was especially large in the early and mid-
twentieth century, and Catholics just as steadily pursued Irish unity at that time. A small 
percentage of Catholics supported Northern Ireland‟s place in the United Kingdom (UK) for 
precisely these economic reasons. Polling of Northern Catholics indicates that they supported 
Irish unification in spite of the fact that recognition was high that it would have left them 
economically worse off.
117
 As further evidence that the desire for a united Ireland was best 
explained by the content of Irish Catholic identity, support for unification remained high in 
the Republic of Ireland despite the openly acknowledged and well known high costs that 
would result for those in the South.
118
 For Irish Catholics in both the North and the South the 
achievement of Irish unity would have had a negative economic impact, but due to their 
strong sense of identity they pursued it despite this. 
     During the relevant period, disagreements existed amongst Irish Catholics regarding how 
soon Irish unification should occur. Influential republicans asserted that it could be achieved 
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rapidly if Britain committed to withdrawal while moderate nationalists suggested that the 
process should take more time, perhaps decades, in order to allay Ulster Protestant fears.
119
 
Despite this significant difference in philosophy, Irish Catholics had a common vision for the 
island‟s eventual sovereign status. In sum, prior to the outbreak of the Troubles and 
throughout the long negotiation process in Northern Ireland, Irish Catholics were essentially 
unified in their aspiration for a united Ireland. This value was strongly held and was the 
central element of Irish Catholic ethnic identity. 
The Content of Ulster Protestant Identity 
     Just as Catholicism was the clearest indication of native Irish ancestry, Protestantism was 
seen as the marker of British settler lineage. Ulster Protestant was thus an ethnic group within 
Northern Ireland that did not necessarily imply religious belief. Therefore, although the 
conflict in Northern Ireland should not be seen as fundamentally a theological conflict, 
religious identification was the basis upon which the two opposing ethnic groups were 
divided.
120
 
The Union 
     The fundamental uniting element of Ulster Protestant identity during the period preceding 
the Troubles and throughout the following negotiation process was the necessity of 
maintaining Northern Ireland‟s place in the United Kingdom. Ulster Protestants referred to 
the province‟s bond with Great Britain as the Union and their guiding political philosophy as 
unionism. Although Ulster Protestants differed in whether they conceived of the Union in 
civic or ethnic terms, their preference for devolved or fully integrated rule, and the extent of 
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power and rights that should be extended to Northern nationalists, the assumption was 
essentially universal amongst this ethnic group that the Union should be maintained and 
integration into an all-Ireland republic resisted.
121
 
     Much of the content of Ulster Protestant identity was shaped by a body of influential 
unionist literature, which flourished during times when the Union was threatened.
122
 Many of 
the themes featured in these works were also communicated to the Protestant public by 
influential political figures through various media channels, including newspapers, radio, and 
television.
123
 
     Just as the vast majority of Northern Catholics were educated in Catholic schools, Ulster 
Protestants overwhelmingly attended Protestant schools. The teaching of history in these 
schools was of a decidedly partisan nature and assisted in identity transmission. British 
imperial history was emphasized and Irish history largely neglected. Students in Protestant 
schools were also directed toward participation in traditionally British sports. This 
educational system cultivated a strong sense of attachment to the British mainland and 
British people amongst young Ulster Protestants.
124
 
     The Orange Order social organization was also particularly important in the process of 
unionist indoctrination in Northern Ireland. Participation amongst Ulster Protestant adult men 
in the explicitly sectarian organization was extremely widespread, and its frequent elaborate 
parades drew tremendous attention amongst the general public, evoked ethnic pride, and 
cultivated a deep emotional connection to the Union rooted in a noble history. The most 
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important of these marches were those held annually on July 12 to commemorate the Battle 
of the Boyne, the decisive Protestant victory that secured English, and subsequently British, 
control over Ireland and Ulster in 1690.
125
 
     Various justifications for the Union, both positive and negative, were offered by Ulster 
Protestant opinion leaders. National allegiance and a cultural and historical attachment to 
Great Britain were the primary positive arguments for the continued existence of the Union. 
Ulster Protestant identity was multifaceted, with loyalties both to the local community and 
Britain. For the most militant unionists, known as loyalists, the emphasis was placed upon 
Ulster with the Crown having secondary, though highly significant, importance. This strain 
of unionism was strongly associated with Presbyterian heritage. Other Protestants attached 
their loyalty to Britain first. The relative importance of these primary loyalties to Britain and 
Ulster varied over time, but despite such fluctuation the imagined connection to the British 
mainland remained a constant for Ulster Protestants. Ulster Protestants also firmly rejected 
the Irish nationalist argument that they either are or should be part of the Irish nation. They 
maintained that their religion, ethnicity, and national identity are distinct and they are 
historically linked to Britain.
126
 
     Other themes drawn upon that aroused intense emotional support for the Union included 
pride in Britain‟s imperial legacy, traditional British culture, and the actions of past Ulster 
Protestants in defending the Union. The Ulster Protestant resistance to the Irish home rule 
movement was a source of immense pride and was treated with admiration by unionist 
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historians.
127
 Other influential unionists stressed the merits of the United Kingdom‟s more 
modern history, depicting it as a model democracy. Those who advocated and were 
influenced by such progressive arguments for unionism typically sought to have Northern 
Ireland fully integrated into the United Kingdom as if it were a part of England.
128
 
     Negative arguments for the maintenance of the Union revolved around fears of being 
overwhelmed in an assertively Catholic and ethnically Irish state. These fears motivated 
Ulster Protestants to oppose Irish home rule before the island‟s partition, and carried over 
and were reinforced by the development of the Irish Free State and the Republic of Ireland. 
Ulster Protestants contested that the Republic had a distinctly Catholic character. The most 
cited elements of this were the Irish Constitution‟s placing of sovereign authority in the 
“Most Holy Trinity” and the application of Catholic morality codes to divorce and abortion 
law. Fears were increased by the decline in the Protestant population of the Republic of 
Ireland from ten percent in 1911 to 4.1 percent in 1971, with some influential Ulster 
Protestants referring to this as “religious genocide.”129 
     The Republic was also feared due to its ethnic character. The emphasis placed on the Irish 
language was seen as particularly offensive. Some Ulster Protestants were also highly critical 
of Irish culture, seeing it as inferior to British culture. Anti-British attitudes in the Republic 
were highly offensive to Protestants. The Republic‟s constitutional claim over Northern 
Ireland was deeply resented and seen as clear evidence of Ireland‟s hostility to Ulster 
Protestants. Republican violence during the Troubles also served to reinforce unionist 
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attitudes regarding Irish Catholic hostility. To those with these fears of Catholicism and 
ethnic Irish nationalism, the Union was seen as a vital protector of the Ulster Protestant way 
of life.
130
 
     Ulster Protestants also justified the continued existence of the Union by refuting Irish 
Catholic claims regarding the injustice of partition and the colonial nature of Britain‟s 
presence on the island. Protestants argued vigorously against the Irish nationalist assertion 
that the entire island of Ireland was the only appropriate unit of self-determination either 
before or after 1920. Most convincingly for their case, unionist intellectuals cited the 
scholarly literature regarding political geography which rejected the claim that national 
boundaries are ever natural. Ulster Protestants frequently argued that the most appropriate 
unit for a plebiscite before partition was the British Isles, which would have denied Ireland 
independence altogether. It was also argued that the six counties that came to make up 
Northern Ireland were an appropriate unit for self-determination in 1920, and even a 
generous compromise, and after the island‟s partition Northern Ireland remained the 
appropriate unit of self-determination. As Protestants remained the majority in Northern 
Ireland, the preferences of the Catholic minority were seen as unimportant. Furthermore, 
opinion polls and unionist literature demonstrate that Ulster Protestants largely denied the 
existence or extent of discrimination suffered by Catholics in Northern Ireland. Some 
Protestants also advanced the argument that it is not territorial units which have the right to 
self-determination, but self-defined nations. Ulster Protestants, it was claimed, were therefore 
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entitled to determine for themselves what state they wished to be part of.
131
 
     Ulster Protestants also firmly rejected the Irish republican assertion that Ireland before 
partition and Northern Ireland after partition were British colonies, asserting that both were 
integral parts of the United Kingdom. The creation of the Irish Free State was therefore 
depicted as secession rather than decolonization, and Northern Ireland‟s incorporation into 
the Republic would similarly be an act of secession.
132
 But unlike Irish Catholics in both the 
North and South who saw themselves as part of a single nation and sought unity, Britons 
living on the mainland generally did not regard Ulster Protestants as British, did not consider 
Northern Ireland to be part of their state, and strongly supported giving up the province. 
Mainland Britons therefore saw Northern Ireland in a colonial way rather than as an integral 
part of their national territory, and often resented Ulster Protestants for continuing to burden 
them with the issue.
133
 
     It should not be ignored that there were also clear material incentives for Ulster 
Protestants to oppose Irish home rule before the 1920 partition and to seek the maintenance 
of the Union afterward. Ulster Protestants consistently made the case that they would suffer 
economically if they were to join the less advanced Republic of Ireland. Ulster‟s industrial 
development connected it much more with Britain than with the rest of Ireland, and Northern 
Ireland received significant subsidies from the United Kingdom. Protestants also benefited 
from the economic discrimination against Catholics, and this would have likely disappeared 
if Ireland was united.
134
 Unlike the other justifications given for the Union, these material 
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interests should not be seen as deriving from Ulster Protestant identity. But it would be 
inaccurate to depict material self-interest as the only factor that explained Ulster Protestant 
defense of the Union or even a necessary one. Survey results demonstrated that over a third 
of Ulster Protestants believed that joining a united Ireland would either not impact or would 
improve their economic situation. As support for the continuation of the Union was 
essentially universal amongst Ulster Protestants during the period under consideration, this is 
significant evidence that their preferences were not solely determined by material 
considerations.
135
 Rather, like Irish Catholics, the preference of Ulster Protestants regarding 
Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status was a product of their ethnic identity. 
     In sum, the Union of Northern Ireland and Great Britain was central to the identity of 
Ulster Protestants both before the onset of the Troubles and during the subsequent 
negotiation process. Polling indicates that Ulster Protestants almost universally feared losing 
their identity in a united Ireland.
136
 These fears, along with an imagined connection with the 
people of the British mainland, explain why it was of such intense importance to Ulster 
Protestants that British sovereignty over Northern Ireland be maintained. 
Conflicting Elements of Identity in the Northern Ireland Conflict 
     My examination of the content of the ethnic antagonists‟ identities in the Northern Ireland 
conflict reveals that Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants did indeed hold opposing values 
sacred. The unification of Ireland and the maintenance of the Union were contradictory 
goals, and these aspirations were fundamentally derived from the content of ethnic identity as 
opposed to material interests.
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING THE CAUSE OF ETHNIC CIVIL CONFLICT 
     In this chapter, I will assess the cause of violent ethnic civil conflict using my two 
selected cases. Consistent with the assumption of those scholars who argue that resolving 
ethnic civil conflict requires addressing the content of ethnic narratives, my hypothesis will 
be that conflicting elements of ethnic identity cause violent ethnic civil conflict to occur. 
Specifically, my hypothesis for the Israeli-Palestinian case will be that the conflicting 
elements of identity I recognized in the last chapter were directly responsible for the 
occurrence of the Intifada beginning in December 1987. For the Northern Ireland case I will 
posit the hypothesis that the conflicting ethnic values identified in the last chapter caused the 
Troubles to occur. 
Methodology 
     For each case, I will perform a historical analysis and utilize the counterfactual 
approach
137
 in order to test my hypothesis and determine what the cause of violent conflict 
actually was. The independent variable deemed responsible should not only be a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of the conflict under examination, but should be sufficient to 
have made the occurrence of violence highly likely.
138
 An examination of the histories of 
these cases using primary sources would be impractical due to language barriers, problems of 
access to documents, and time constraints. Fortunately, it is also unnecessary. There already 
exist many fine scholarly accounts of the histories of both cases, and I will utilize those 
which I find the most reputable and nonpartisan. There is, however, more consistency 
between accounts of the history leading up to the Troubles in Northern Ireland than those 
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examining the history leading up to the Intifada in Israel-Palestine. Even the best accounts of 
Israeli-Palestinian history have a noticeably more partisan nature. For this reason it is 
necessary to examine more sources regarding this case as compared to Northern Ireland in 
order to put together an accurate and complete account. 
Case 1: A Historical Background to the Intifada 
     A background to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict most appropriately begins with the onset 
of Jewish nationalist settlement in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. The area, then 
ruled by the Ottoman Empire, had an overwhelmingly Arab population with perhaps five 
percent being traditional Orthodox Jews.
139
 Anti-Semitism spurred a mass Jewish exodus 
from Eastern Europe in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with a small 
minority immigrating to the land that Jews regarded as their ancestral homeland with 
aspirations of building a state. These Jewish nationalists, eventually referred to as Zionists, 
purchased privately held land for the establishment of agricultural settlements and also joined 
existing urban communities. The charitable Jewish National Fund (JNF) began acquiring 
land in Palestine for national ownership in 1902, making immigration more feasible.
140
 
     Rising land prices led wealthy Arab absentee land owners to sell to Zionists, which 
frequently resulted in the displacement of Arab tenant farmers. Anger at displacement was 
mitigated somewhat by the ability to find employment on the new Jewish farms, which 
initially relied overwhelmingly on Arab labor due to its significantly lower cost. The 
resulting difficulty that Zionist immigrants encountered in finding agricultural employment 
led them to seek the implementation of exclusionary labor practices in the first decade of the 
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twentieth century. Opportunities were subsequently created on JNF lands that provided 
employment at acceptable wages. These exclusionary labor practices meant that Zionist land 
purchases increasingly resulted in not only the displacement, but also the loss of employment 
opportunities for Arab peasant farmers. A number of violent incidents resulted and anti-
Zionist sentiments began to be expressed amongst the urban Arab elite.
141
 This hostility 
against the Zionist enterprise backfired though, as it increased settler support for the 
exclusionary strategy.
142
 
     World War I completely transformed the political status of the Middle East, as the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed and its territory was divided by Britain and France, with Palestine 
coming under British control in 1917 and 1918. Due to a combination of imperial, religious, 
and military strategic interests, Britain decided to support the Zionist enterprise and issued 
the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917 which expressed support for the creation of a 
Jewish national “home” in Palestine. The British Mandate for Palestine that followed called 
for the establishment of a Jewish Agency to assist in governing Palestine. Though 
constituting approximately 90 percent of Palestine‟s population at the time, the Arabs‟ 
national aspirations were not recognized, nor were they to be involved in any significant way 
in the governing of Palestine as were the Zionists. This relationship would enable the success 
of Zionism and have absolutely devastating consequences for the Arab majority.
143
 Under the 
British Mandate, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased significantly, especially in 
response to the rise of Nazism in the 1930s.
144
 Arab opposition to Zionism strengthened 
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throughout the period and led to revolts in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936-1939.
145
 
     Violent Zionist pressure and sympathy for the Zionist cause due to the Holocaust led to 
Britain‟s decision in 1947 to leave Palestine and hand responsibility for the problem to the 
United Nations (UN).
146
 The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181 on November 29, 
1947 which supported the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.
147
 A civil war 
began in Palestine the next day. The Zionist forces were clearly superior and secured control 
over the coastal plain, two inland valleys, and West Jerusalem.
148
 
     On May 14, 1948 David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the State of Israel, 
which led several Arab armies to immediately enter the fighting. Again, the Israeli forces 
were clearly superior to their Arab adversaries and gained more land. Transjordan 
(subsequently renamed Jordan) took the West Bank (including Jerusalem‟s Old City), Egypt 
gained the Gaza Strip, and the rest of Palestine became the State of Israel.
149
 
     Approximately half of the Palestinian population lost their homes and property in the two 
parts of the war. These 700,000 refugees had fled or been expelled from what became Israel 
and found themselves scattered in refugee camps and established communities in the 
surrounding Arab states. Israel rejected their right to return in order to maintain a strong 
Jewish majority within its expanded territory. About 150,000 Palestinians remained as Israeli 
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citizens, although most of their land was seized and they would be subjected to martial law 
for nearly two decades.
150
 
     Low scale fighting continued between 1949 and 1956 as Palestinian refugees periodically 
carried out small attacks in Israel and Israel fired at infiltrators and conducted retaliatory 
raids. This phenomenon essentially ended though in 1956 after Egypt and Jordan tightened 
their borders with Israel following the next Arab-Israeli war.
151
 Although violent conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians was virtually nonexistent for nearly a decade after the 
1956 war, preparations for confrontation were made. Palestinian nationalist activity grew in 
the 1950s and 1960s, most importantly through student groups at universities in the diaspora. 
Yasser Arafat established the Fatah organization in Kuwait in 1959, which sought the 
liberation of Palestine through an armed insurrection. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation 
Organization was established by the Arab League as a competitor to Fatah. Small armed 
attacks were carried out against Israel beginning in January 1965, primarily by Fatah, and 
resulted in limited casualties.
152
 
     Tensions between Israel and its neighbors increased dramatically in 1967, leading to a war 
between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. At the war‟s end Israel controlled the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, Egypt‟s Sinai Peninsula, and Syria‟s Golan 
Heights. The area conquered was more than three times as large as Israel just six days earlier, 
and included lands holy to Judaism. More than one million Palestinians came under Israeli 
control and an additional 200,000 to 300,000 Palestinians became refugees.
153
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     East Jerusalem and adjacent areas of the West Bank were promptly made part of an 
expanded Jerusalem municipality. With Arab rejection of peace in exchange for the return of 
occupied territories, Israel made clear its unwillingness to return to its pre-1967 borders in 
other areas as well. Although never officially adopted, the Israeli government acted 
according to a plan devised by Labor cabinet minister Yigal Allon in July 1967, which 
remained unofficial Labor policy thereafter. The Allon Plan envisioned that about two-thirds 
of the West Bank would eventually be returned to Jordan, certain areas would be retained 
that would enhance Israeli security, and settlement would be avoided in areas with significant 
Palestinian population.
154
 
     De jure annexation of the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip was considered unacceptable 
by the Israeli government, primarily because awarding citizenship to the Palestinians who 
remained there would have endangered Israel‟s status as a Jewish state. However, Israel in 
effect gradually created a policy of de facto annexation of the territories. Large tracts of land 
were seized in order to establish Israeli military bases in the West Bank and Jewish 
settlements. The West Bank‟s aquifers were exploited overwhelmingly for Israeli use. The 
Palestinian population was utilized by Israeli businesses as a source of cheap labor and a 
captive market for Israeli products.
155
 
     Fatah launched attacks against Israel later in 1967, hoping to spark a popular rebellion 
amongst Palestinians within Israel and the OPT. The brief campaign was an unqualified 
failure though and the anticipated uprising failed to materialize. Fatah developed a new 
strategy of carrying out guerrilla attacks against Israeli targets from bases it established in 
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Jordan later in 1967. These attacks elevated Arafat‟s status, and within a year he became 
chairman of the PLO and Fatah became its dominant group. But by 1970 the PLO threatened 
to overthrow the Jordanian government, leading Jordan to forcibly evict the PLO. The PLO 
leadership subsequently reestablished its central command in Beirut and went on to form a de 
facto state-within-a-state in Lebanon. The PLO launched periodic small attacks into Israel 
from Lebanon‟s Palestinian refugee camps, which were met with more significant Israeli 
counterattacks.
156
 
     Various Palestinian organizations also turned to international terrorist attacks against 
Israelis, Jews, and allies of Israel in order to raise the profile of the Palestinian cause. 
Between 1968 and 1977, twenty-nine airplanes were the target of either successful or failed 
hijackings. A Fatah terrorist organization, Black September, gained tremendous attention by 
taking eleven Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Olympics in Munich and killing them. Israel 
responded to these incidents by launching counterattacks on terrorist bases, assassinating 
terrorist leaders, and dramatically improving its security measures. As a result, the campaign 
was largely over by 1977.
157
 
     The PLO continued its attacks from southern Lebanon though, leading Israel to launch a 
limited military campaign in 1978 and a full-scale invasion in 1982 that successfully 
destroyed the PLO presence in Lebanon. With the PLO leadership subsequently reestablished 
in distant Tunisia and its armed units dispersed far away from Israel, the organization was 
dramatically weakened and no longer posed a threat to Israel.
158
 
     Israeli policy in the OPT transformed with the election of a right-wing government led by 
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Menachem Begin in 1977. Begin‟s Likud party had formed a close relationship with the 
religious-Zionist movement that aimed to settle and retain all of the occupied territories. 
Although Israeli governments led by the Labor party had invested heavily in the settlement of 
East Jerusalem and certain strategic areas of the OPT, the new government focused its efforts 
on creating a Jewish presence in areas of religious significance that were situated amongst 
major Palestinian population centers. Large tracts of private Palestinian land were 
confiscated in order to build these new settlements. The Allon Plan was completely 
abandoned, and the new objective was the permanent incorporation of the West Bank into 
Israel.
159
 
     Israel employed several tactics to squelch Palestinian dissent in the OPT. Political 
freedoms were extremely limited and the press was strictly censored. Israel paid existing 
local leaders who were willing to cooperate with its administration and actively suppress 
Palestinian nationalists. Most important though was Israel‟s military presence in the OPT, 
which routinely used violent intimidation, torture, and collaboration to maintain control over 
the Palestinian population. Israel utilized legal procedures typical of wartime, routinely 
expelled problematic Palestinian activists, imposed curfews, shut down businesses and 
schools when it deemed necessary, and required travel and work permits. These tactics were 
able to maintain order in the OPT until 1987.
160
 
     A popular uprising known as the Intifada (shaking off) broke out in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in December 1987, transforming the Palestinian struggle from an external terrorist 
and guerilla campaign into a violent civil conflict. Instigation for the revolt was completely 
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local and it was unexpected by the PLO, which had never been able to entrench itself in the 
OPT. On December 8, 1987 a traffic accident in the Gaza Strip occurred in which an Israeli 
driver caused the death of four Palestinians. Angry Palestinians subsequently attacked a 
nearby Israeli army post with stones. By the next morning, confrontations became 
increasingly violent and then proceeded to spread throughout the OPT in the next two days. 
Order had deteriorated for the first time since Israel had occupied the territories in 1967. The 
uprising came under the coordination of a new local leadership that referred to itself as the 
Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories and stated the goal 
of establishing an independent Palestinian state. Instructions were communicated to the 
public through printed leaflets which eventually featured the signature of the PLO as well. 
Crowds of stone throwing boys confronting Israeli soldiers became the Intifada‟s trademark, 
but other violent and nonviolent tactics were also employed. Two Islamic groups, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, also put their own particularly violent stamp on the uprising.
161
 
     Israel unsuccessfully attempted to put down the Intifada through moderate force and mass 
imprisonment. Very early on, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin concluded that only a 
negotiated solution could restore order. The view that Israel‟s security needs were not best 
met by controlling and colonizing the OPT became widespread amongst the Israeli public 
and defense establishment. Much of the Zionist left began supporting a two-state solution to 
the conflict, but other Israelis moved to the right, with polling indicating that nearly half of 
Israeli Jews supported some degree of ethnic cleansing.
162
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     Pressured by the local leadership in the OPT, the PLO moderated its position. On 
November 15, 1988, Arafat rhetorically declared the independence of the State of Palestine. 
While the declaration did not explicitly recognize Israel‟s right to exist or define the 
territorial extent of the Palestinian state, it rooted its legitimacy in United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 181, which called for the partition of Palestine.
163
 
     The Intifada brought the Palestinian problem to the center of international attention and 
convinced a large segment of the Israeli public that military control of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip was not a viable long term option. It became clear that neither side would be able 
to achieve its objective through force, at least not at an acceptable cost. The Palestinians were 
unable to remove Israel from the territories and Israel was unable to restore order.
164
 
What Caused the Intifada? 
     A review of the history reveals that violent conflict between Jews and Arabs over Israel-
Palestine occurred in several distinct phases and involved multiple actors. The first period of 
violent conflict was between Palestine‟s Jews and Arabs, beginning with the displacement of 
Palestinian farmers through exclusionary Zionist land purchase around 1908 and continuing 
through the British Mandate until the establishment of the State of Israel and the dispersal of 
the Palestinian people. At this point, conflict over Israel-Palestine transformed from a civil 
conflict into an interstate conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This period of 
conflict culminated in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, though it continued in a more limited form 
thereafter. The Palestinians played only a very minor role in this phase of conflict. The next 
distinct dimension of conflict was the terrorist and guerilla campaign waged by several 
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Palestinian organizations outside of Israel-Palestine, most notably the PLO, against Israeli 
targets both within Israel and internationally. Although this phase began in limited form 
before the 1967 war, it came into full force afterward. This conflict was essentially ended 
through Israel‟s military victory against the PLO in Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli-Palestinian 
civil conflict that resulted in the Oslo peace process only began in December 1987. 
Significantly, the Intifada did not include any meaningful participation by the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel. Rather, it was distinctly a revolt by the Palestinians of the OPT.
165
 
     Therefore, any credible explanation of the Intifada must explain why the Palestinians of 
the OPT were fully involved while the Palestinians of Israel proper were not. Despite the fact 
that the Israeli government referred to the Palestinian citizens of Israel as “Israeli Arabs,” the 
overwhelming majority regarded themselves and were seen by other Palestinians as part of 
the Palestinian people and identified with the Palestinian narrative and national symbols.
166
 
This leads to the conclusion that the cause of the Intifada was the conditions that existed 
within the OPT, rather than the content of Palestinian identity.
167
 
     The cause of the Intifada is clear from a review of the history. Israel‟s system of rule in 
the OPT was highly unequal, as the small Jewish minority was given superior rights while 
the Palestinian majority was harshly discriminated against and left without political power. 
The territories were administered for the benefit of Israeli Jews with little regard for the 
Palestinians. This is consistent with the explanation of violent civil conflict as deriving from 
unequal distributions of power in divided societies. 
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     It could be argued that the Jewish Israeli value of maintaining a Jewish state was 
responsible for Israel‟s denial of rights to the Palestinians in the OPT. However, the actual 
cause of ethnic inequality in the OPT was the Jewish state‟s de facto expansion into the 
territories and not the Jewish state per se. Under the counterfactual scenario that Israel had 
never occupied and de facto annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip in such a manner, the 
Intifada would not have occurred. Israel‟s unequal system of control over the OPT was 
therefore a necessary condition for the occurrence of the violent civil conflict that began in 
1987. 
     This unequal system also appears to be sufficient to have caused the violence, as the 
Intifada would have likely occurred even if other previous events or ethnic values were 
counterfactually manipulated, such as if Palestinian refugees had not been created in 1948 
and the right of return was therefore not an issue. And while the parties each wanted to 
control Jerusalem‟s holy sites, there is no evidence to suggest that the Intifada was caused by 
conflicting claims over these sites. It appears equally likely that the Intifada would have 
occurred if Jerusalem had no importance to Jewish Israelis or Palestinians. 
     The only element of Jewish Israeli or Palestinian identity that contributed to the ethnic 
inequality in the OPT was the religious-Zionist value of Israeli control over the entire Land 
of Israel. An end to Israeli-Palestinian violent civil conflict would therefore require a 
redistribution of power between the ethnic antagonists which would necessarily require a 
violation of the central religious-Zionist value. 
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Case 2: A Historical Background to the Troubles 
     English intervention in Ireland can be traced as far back as 1169, when the Normans 
invaded and established control over parts of the island and created the Lordship of Ireland. 
English control declined over time, but intensified during the rule of Henry VIII who 
declared himself to be King of Ireland in 1541. After Queen Elizabeth‟s English forces 
defeated a Gaelic rebellion in the northern province of Ulster in 1603, a settler presence was 
established on confiscated lands in 1607.
168
 
     Under the Ulster plantation, settlers flooded in from Scotland and England. The 
newcomers cleared many of the Gaels from the land and utilized others for labor, built 
twenty-three new settlements, and avoided intermarriage with the native population. Religion 
reinforced the distinction between the two communities, with the natives being Catholic and 
the settlers Protestant. A series of Penal Laws were instituted to systematically disadvantage 
the Catholic population. The stability of the Ulster plantation was not secured until 1690 
though, when the Protestant William of Orange defeated the Catholic James II in the Battle 
of the Boyne.
169
 
     During the 1700s, the Kingdom‟s discriminatory measures targeted Presbyterians as well 
as Catholics. Protestants opposed to the existing forms of legal discrimination based upon 
religious identification formed the Society of United Irishmen in Belfast in 1791 with the 
goal of creating a unifying Irish identity and radically reforming the Irish Parliament. In 1798 
the United Irishmen led an armed rebellion against England with the aim of establishing an 
independent Irish republic. The violence was only localized though, and failed to draw 
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significant Catholic participation. At the same time, the Penal Laws were being repealed, and 
soon after the Act of Union was passed which resulted in Ireland‟s full integration into 
British institutions in 1801 as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was 
established. These factors all but ended political cooperation between Catholics and 
Presbyterians and united Protestants once again in common cause.
170
 
     Developments in Britain led to the emergence of true democracy there beginning in the 
1860s. Inspired by these advances and the rise of nationalist movements on the European 
continent, Charles Stewart Parnell established himself as the preeminent Irish nationalist 
leader of the period. Despite being Protestant himself, Parnell‟s National League and Irish 
Parliamentary Party, both founded in 1882, adopted a distinctly Catholic tone with the clergy 
taking a pronounced role. Irish Catholics also attempted to assert a more distinctively Gaelic 
culture and rid themselves of English influence. In the 1885 election, Parnell‟s party won the 
vast majority of Irish seats. April 1886 saw the introduction of the first Home Rule Bill at 
Westminster, which proposed giving Ireland a large degree of autonomy. The bill failed 
though, as did a second Home Rule Bill that was offered in 1892.
171
 
     A lengthy period of Conservative rule subsequently delayed consideration of the issue. 
Ulster‟s Protestants effectively organized a united opposition during this period that was 
motivated by the population‟s ethnic, national, religious, and economic ties to Britain and 
fears of being drawn into an assertively Catholic, Gaelic, and economically inferior polity. 
Opposition to the 1909 Ne Temere papal decree consolidated Protestant resistance to being 
drawn into a Catholic dominated Ireland. So when the general election in December 1910 
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gave the Irish Nationalists the balance of power and a third Home Rule Bill was introduced 
in 1912, the Protestant opposition was mobilized.
172
 
     The Protestant churches took the lead in promoting the Ulster Covenant in 1912, which 
committed Protestants to upholding Ulster‟s place in the United Kingdom with the implied 
threat of violence if required. The mass importation of weapons began and the armed Ulster 
Volunteer Force was established. In Britain, the Conservatives and much of the Army backed 
the Ulster Unionists, with nearly two million on the mainland signing a covenant against 
Home Rule.
173
 
     Although the Home Rule Bill passed in 1914, the outbreak of World War I postponed its 
implementation and relegated the Irish question to lower priority status. Irish republicans 
turned to force to achieve independence, launching the Easter Rising in April 1916 and 
rhetorically establishing the Irish Republic. The insurrection was quickly put down by a 
brutal British response, but served to radicalize Catholic opinion in Ireland. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) launched an armed struggle to oust the British from the island in 
January 1919. Ulster‟s Protestants became convinced that some form of partition was 
inevitable and debate turned to devising the most desirable border. It was decided that three 
of Ulster‟s nine counties should be abandoned due to their significant Catholic majorities, 
leaving Northern Ireland 66 percent Protestant. This led to the enactment of the Government 
of Ireland Act in June 1921, partitioning Ireland into two autonomous parts. The guerilla war 
against Britain ended when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on December 6, 1921.
174
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     The IRA then turned its attention to fighting the North, but this campaign was halted on 
June 28, 1922 when an internal dispute over the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty sent the 
South into a civil war. The treaty supporters emerged victorious, and although still aspiring 
ultimately to Irish unification, their leader Michael Collins took a more conciliatory stance 
toward the North.
175
 
     The institutions put in place by Britain in 1921 were designed with insufficient attention 
to the divided nature of society in Northern Ireland. It was naively expected that proportional 
representation (PR) alone would provide adequate protection to the Catholic minority. 
Single-member district plurality voting then replaced PR in 1929, and from that point on 
representation remained remarkably consistent with the Unionists taking about three-quarters 
of the seats. The Protestant majority ruled for its own benefit with little regard for the 
Catholic minority. Districts were gerrymandered and voting in local elections was 
determined by property tax paying in order to give the Unionists control over local 
governments in communities with sizeable Catholic majorities. Local and provincial 
government employment and other benefits were then doled out in a partisan manner. Law 
enforcement and justice were also applied in an extremely sectarian fashion. From 1922 to 
1972 the Special Powers Act was in effect, which gave the government powers similar to 
those of martial law although it was completely unnecessary during virtually the entire 
period.
176
 
     In protest of the Unionist refusal to share power, all Nationalist parliamentarians abstained 
for eighteen months beginning in May 1932. After this period, some members periodically 
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walked out in protest of Unionist abuses.
177
 Armed confrontation was unpopular though, as 
an IRA bombing campaign in Britain against partition in 1939 and 1940 failed to garner 
popular support amongst either Northern or Southern Irish Catholics.
178
 
     In 1949 the South became the Republic of Ireland and withdrew from the Commonwealth. 
In response, Britain gave Northern Ireland a more secure status within the Union by passing 
the Ireland Act of 1949, confirming that the province‟s sovereign status would not change 
without the consent of its parliament. Britain also rewarded Northern Ireland for its 
contributions to the Second World War effort, putting the province on secure financial 
footing and providing its people with extensive social services. The Unionist government 
could not resist the temptation to apply this new aid in a discriminatory manner though, 
widening the gap in employment and housing and increasing sectarian polarization.
179
 
     While Northern Ireland was fairing worse economically than the rest of the United 
Kingdom, it offered considerably more materially than the South, even for Catholics. So 
despite relative inequality between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, some 
Catholics were beginning to seek a greater role in the province‟s affairs while still 
maintaining the goal of eventual Irish unity. The Northern Catholic preference for democratic 
rather than violent means was clearly demonstrated by the lack of support that an IRA armed 
campaign from 1956 to 1962 drew.
180
 
     A Catholic movement under the name National Unity was formed in 1959 and became the 
National Democratic Party in 1964. It supported a united Ireland, but conditioned this upon 
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majority consent of the North‟s people. It also accepted the legitimacy of Northern Ireland‟s 
constitution and supported internal reforms through electoral politics. Although it won only 
one seat at the 1965 general election, it pushed the Nationalist Party to adopt a similarly 
conciliatory strategy and in February 1965 become the Parliament‟s first official 
opposition.
181
 
     Terence O‟Neill assumed the premiership of Northern Ireland in 1963. O‟Neill set 
ambitious targets for new housing and employment and sought to reform local government, 
aiming to improve relations between Protestants and Catholics. The strategy showed signs of 
success, as intercommunity relations began improving noticeably. O‟Neill‟s reforms led to 
significant Protestant anger though, particularly amongst the working class due to the 
perception that Catholics were receiving preferential treatment.
182
 
     Polling indicated that a majority of Protestants endorsed the use of violence in order to 
maintain their privileged position. Paramilitary organizations formed in 1966, including the 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers. Discontent turned 
increasingly violent in June 1966, when members of the UVF shot random Catholics outside 
of a bar, killing one. O‟Neill responded by using the Special Powers Act to outlaw the 
organization.
183
 
     The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed in February 1967 to 
campaign for equal rights for Catholics. The NICRA adopted principles of non-violence and 
was silent on the aspiration of a united Ireland. Its expressed goals were one vote per person 
in local elections, an end to gerrymandering, an end to government discrimination 
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(particularly in the allocation of public housing), an end to the Special Powers Act, and the 
creation of a new non-partisan police force.
184
 
     The NICRA began leading large protest marches in August 1968. The campaign led to a 
Protestant backlash movement led by the Reverend Ian Paisley. In confrontations that 
resulted between the two sides, the police largely came to Paisley‟s aid. The police brutally 
attacked civil rights protestors at an October march, injuring 78 civilians. In response, the 
Nationalist Party gave up its role as the official opposition and Catholic relations with the 
police were further damaged. A Marxist student group, the People‟s Democracy (PD), also 
formed in response to the events, espousing far more radical aims than the NICRA.
185
 
     The British government subsequently pressured Northern Ireland‟s government to accede 
to the NICRA‟s demands. O‟Neill‟s government announced a reform package on November 
22, 1968, to which the NICRA responded by calling a month long cessation of civil rights 
protests. However, opposition came from both sides. O‟Neill faced an internal revolt within 
the Unionist Party to these reforms, and the PD ignored the NICRA‟s call. The PD held a 
four day march from Belfast to Derry beginning on January 1, 1969. On January 4, the police 
responded with extreme recklessness against the Catholics of Derry‟s Bogside, leading a 
local militia to seize control of the area and declare „Free Derry‟ that night.186 
     Unionists became increasingly upset with O‟Neill‟s reforms, especially as they failed to 
end the Catholic revolt. O‟Neill called a general election as a referendum on reform, leading 
to a decline in supporters of his agenda. Protestant objection to reform was particularly 
strong amongst the working-class who feared that Catholic gains would be at their expense. 
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Paisley championed their cause, promising to protect their traditional privilege. From the end 
of March 1969, the UVF undertook a bombing campaign, leading the IRA to follow suit in 
April.
187
 
     Increasing violence led to the radicalization of both communities, making compromise 
more difficult. On April 22, 1969 O‟Neill accepted the principle of equal voting rights in 
local elections, provoking further Unionist opposition. Unable to take the reform process any 
further, O‟Neill resigned from office on April 28 and was replaced by James Chichester-
Clark. Sectarian violence only increased, with Derry and Belfast being the epicenters. An 
Orange Order march in Derry on August 14 led to riots that quickly spread to Belfast. Over 
the next few days Northern Ireland experienced the most significant death and destruction the 
province had seen since the 1920s.
188
  
     More reforms were attempted with mixed results, but Northern Ireland had already 
descended into chaos. „The Troubles,‟ as the violent conflict in Northern Ireland came to be 
known, had begun. The British Army intervened in August 1969, which fueled a rebirth of 
militant republicanism in the Catholic ghettos. The IRA was unprepared to defend vulnerable 
Catholics from loyalist violence, leading to a split within the IRA in December 1969 which 
produced a more extremist variant, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In 
January 1970 the IRA‟s political wing, Sinn Féin, followed suit. The PIRA saw the 
breakdown of Unionist control as an opportunity to achieve a united Ireland, and conducted 
an armed campaign toward that end.
189
 
     The PIRA campaign led to increasing Protestant pressure on the Northern Ireland and UK 
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governments to abandon reform and focus on restoring security. Britain attempted to reform 
policing in Northern Ireland in October 1969, but the new force was similarly partisan. The 
Conservative Party came to power in Britain in 1970 and instituted harsher security measures 
in Northern Ireland, leading to greater Catholic support for the PIRA. The PIRA‟s attacks 
had primarily targeted the British Army, but in 1970 they shifted to a more clearly offensive 
strategy aimed at affecting a speedy British withdrawal, carrying out extensive attacks in 
Northern Ireland and to a lesser degree in Britain against a variety of targets.
190
 
     Heavy-handed British security measures further alienated Northern Catholics. The new 
moderate nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), withdrew from 
Parliament on July 15, 1971 after the British Army shot Catholics in Derry.
191
 A new policy 
of internment without trial was instituted by Britain on August 9, 1971. It was met with 
widespread Catholic outrage and led to a civil disobedience campaign and a Catholic boycott 
of local government. Reports of torture were common and thoroughly poisoned relations 
between the Army and the Catholic community. Moreover, the policy failed to control the 
violence. An anti-internment march in Derry on January 30, 1972 resulted in the British 
Army killing 14 civilians, leading to an unprecedented level of Catholic opposition. The 
event became known as „Bloody Sunday.‟ London imposed direct rule on Northern Ireland, 
causing outrage amongst Protestants.
192
 
     Sectarian violence and the killing of security forces only increased in the following year. 
The PIRA saw the fall of the Northern Ireland government as creating an excellent 
opportunity for forcing a British withdrawal and achieving a united Ireland, and thus 
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ratcheted up their campaign. By February 1972 a Protestant backlash to the PIRA campaign 
was underway, featuring assassinations, bombings, and various attacks on IRA and Catholic 
targets. The PIRA only intensified its efforts, setting off 26 explosions in Belfast on July 21, 
1972. Nine civilians and two soldiers were killed, and 130 were injured, many badly 
mutilated. „Bloody Friday,‟ as the day became known, only further radicalized Protestant 
militants.
193
 Northern Ireland‟s Troubles would grind on for nearly three decades, with 
neither side being able to resolve the conflict through force. 
What Caused the Troubles? 
     An analysis of the history of Northern Ireland does not support the conclusion that the 
Troubles were caused by a conflict between the Irish Catholic desire for the unification of 
Ireland and the Ulster Protestant desire to maintain the Union with Great Britain. While it is 
true that these values were indeed contradictory, the evidence does not suggest that the 
Catholic protest movement was driven by a desire to unify Ireland, although Catholics 
obviously aspired to this, and the Protestant backlash was not motivated merely by a desire to 
uphold the Union, but rather to maintain the privilege that Protestants enjoyed under 
Northern Ireland‟s system of government. 
     Rather, the true cause of the violent civil conflict that began in 1969 was the unequal 
system of government that operated within the divided society that was Northern Ireland. 
Ulster Protestants used strict majoritarian rule in Northern Ireland to run the province for 
their partisan benefit with little regard for the interests of the Catholic minority. Efforts to 
remedy this situation peacefully were largely unsuccessful and Catholic protests were met 
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with violent repression, thus leading to civil unrest. The violent conflict did not begin with 
the republican paramilitary campaign to unite Ireland; rather this goal was pursued in 
response to the breakdown of Northern Ireland‟s government and the opportunity this 
presented. 
     Under the counterfactual scenario that power-sharing had been in place in Northern 
Ireland after 1920, the Troubles would not have occurred despite the contradictory desires of 
Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants regarding the province‟s sovereign status. Institutional 
inequalities were therefore a necessary condition for the occurrence of the Troubles. The 
unequal distribution of power within Northern Ireland was also sufficient to cause the violent 
conflict, as the Troubles would have likely occurred even if Irish Catholics had not aspired to 
Irish unification. The problem was therefore unequal institutional arrangements in a divided 
society rather than conflicting ethnic narratives. 
     The implication of this is that a negotiated agreement to end the violent civil conflict in 
Northern Ireland would not necessarily require that either or both of the ethnic groups 
concede their deeply held identity-based value, Irish unification for Irish Catholics and the 
maintenance of the Union for Ulster Protestants. The necessary element of a negotiated 
settlement would be the restructuring of power relations between Northern Ireland‟s two 
ethnic communities. 
What Causes Ethnic Civil Conflict? 
     Although the preceding analysis examined only two cases, the hypothesis that 
contradictory ethnic narratives cause violent civil conflict to occur is not supported. Rather, 
both the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland cases support the hypothesis that unequal 
59 
 
distributions of power in divided societies lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. The 
consequence of this finding is that in such cases power inequalities must be addressed in 
order to end violence, but conflicting ethnic narratives may not need to be altered.
60 
 
CHAPTER 5: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INCLUSION VERSUS 
POSTPONEMENT OF IDENTITY-BASED ISSUES 
The Negotiation Process: Designing a Formula 
     Negotiation processes can be seen as occurring in three phases. First, the parties diagnose 
the problem and agree to attempt resolution of the conflict through negotiation. Next, a 
formula is agreed upon outlining the issues for which a resolution will be sought and defining 
in broad terms what the criteria will be for arriving at a solution that addresses these agreed 
upon issues. In the final phase, the details are negotiated that provide solutions to the issues 
that the parties have decided to address, resulting in a negotiated settlement. In reality, these 
phases are rarely so clearly divided, and backtracking frequently occurs from the detail phase 
to the formula phase as problems become evident. These phases, especially the development 
of a formula, may occur gradually over many years with initially vague agreements being 
replaced by increasingly specific agreements over time.
194
 
     In order for a negotiation formula to successfully resolve a particular conflict, it must 
naturally address the cause of the dispute. This means that any successful negotiated 
settlement to violent civil conflict must resolve the underlying cause or causes of violence. 
While it is certainly preferable for a negotiation formula to be as comprehensive as possible 
and address all of the issues of dispute between the parties, it should be remembered that the 
purpose of negotiation is not to permanently end all disagreements between the parties, as 
disagreement is a normal part of politics. Rather, the purpose of civil conflict negotiation is 
to remove the condition that caused the occurrence of violence and restore or create normal 
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functioning politics between the parties. It is therefore possible to postpone permanent 
resolution of certain issues that it is determined would inhibit agreement on the fundamental 
issues that must be resolved in order for a meaningful agreement to be reached. Zimbabwe‟s 
Lancaster House negotiations provide an example of this, as agreement on the makeup of a 
new national army was postponed until after elections for the new government were 
conducted. Procedures can even be agreed upon for resolving these postponed matters at a 
future time.
195
 
     While the literature regarding approaches for addressing ethnic identity-based issues in 
civil conflict negotiation clearly presents the unique difficulty of inducing concessions on 
these elements, in that they resist compromise through rewards and punishments, my 
examination of the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts does not support the 
literature‟s underlying assumption that conflicting elements of ethnic identity are the cause of 
violent civil conflict. If these conflicting elements of identity were the cause of civil conflict, 
they would certainly need to be addressed. But as I determined that the actual cause of 
violence was the unequal institutional arrangements in these divided societies, it may have 
been possible to simply postpone for future resolution the conflicting identity-based issues 
while reaching an agreement that dealt with the fundamental cause of violence and restored 
order. I will therefore assess the impact of including for permanent resolution versus 
postponing conflicting identity-based issues on the outcome of civil conflict negotiations. 
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Methodology 
     In this chapter, I will test the hypothesis that inclusion for permanent resolution versus 
postponement of conflicting identity-based issues affects the outcome of civil conflict 
negotiations. I will analyze the negotiation processes of the two civil conflicts that I have 
already examined, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland. As these cases both share in 
common the presence of conflicting identity-based issues but, as will be shown, differ in 
whether they included or postponed the central identity-based issues from the negotiation 
formula for permanent resolution, I will be able to use the comparative method
196
 with the 
most similar research design.
197
 In addition, I will use the counterfactual approach
198
 to test 
my hypothesis within each case. 
     First, I will conduct historical analyses of each negotiation process to determine which 
disputed identity-based issues were included for permanent resolution in the settlement 
formula utilized and which were postponed for future resolution, and then determine the 
impact that this inclusion or postponement had on the negotiation of details and the outcome 
of the process. The use of counterfactual analysis will help determine the impact within each 
case. 
     This historical analysis will primarily utilize insider accounts of each negotiation process. 
As negotiation processes are not public events with official transcripts, these insider accounts 
offer the best evidence of what items proved to be most difficult in negotiation and which 
were uncontroversial. All insider accounts are not equally useful though, as many have been 
written by partisan individuals who misrepresent what actually occurred. I therefore use 
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sources that are as neutral as possible. For the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations this was 
particularly difficult. I rely primarily upon the account of the French journalist Charles 
Enderlin
199
 who had the most complete access to participants in the negotiations and was 
therefore able to put together a comprehensive account. Participants from both sides have 
agreed that Enderlin‟s account of the negotiation process is the most accurate available. I also 
utilize the analysis of the scholar Jeremy Pressman,
200
 who reviewed all available accounts in 
order to synthesize a brief reconstruction of the negotiations over details. For Northern 
Ireland, unbiased accounts were written by firsthand participants in the talks. The most useful 
of these were by the American mediator to the talks that produced the Good Friday 
Agreement, George Mitchell,
201
 and Tony Blair‟s chief negotiator from 1997 to the end of 
the process, Jonathan Powell.
202
  
     After examining both cases and performing counterfactual analyses, I will also compare 
the two cases to each other to determine the impact of including for permanent resolution 
versus postponing conflicting ethnic identity-based issues on the outcome of civil conflict 
negotiations. I will test my hypothesis with both of these approaches because there are 
weaknesses to each method. The counterfactual approach is imperfect because it is 
impossible to know for certain what would have happened if an independent variable were 
changed. The comparative method is flawed because there will always be more than one 
difference between even the most similar cases, so it is impossible to determine conclusively 
that a certain independent variable is responsible for a difference seen in outcome. By 
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utilizing both of these methods I will be able to perform a better test of my hypothesis than if 
I used only one. 
Case 1: The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiation Process 
     Motivated by the stalemate of the Intifada and mutual fears of increasing international 
isolation, the American administration of President George H. W. Bush was able to convince 
the parties to seek a negotiated resolution to the conflict. The first step in the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiation process was the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. 
Palestinian representatives formed a joint delegation with Jordan, signaling a renewal of the 
previously discarded Amman Agreement of 1985 that sought to establish a confederation 
between Jordan and a future Palestinian state. The Palestinians were not officially 
represented by the PLO, but rather by prominent figures from within the West Bank and 
Gaza. After the international conference, the Israeli and Palestinian representatives engaged 
in bilateral negotiations in Washington, D.C. In response to the Madrid conference, unrest in 
the OPT began to decrease. However, the negotiations were strongly condemned by the 
rejectionist Palestinian forces including the PFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and deadly 
attacks by these groups increased.
203
  
     Israeli elections were held on June 23, 1992 that resulted in a dramatic shift to the parties 
supportive of concessions to the Palestinians. The major campaign issue had been the peace 
process, and its foremost advocate, Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party, replaced the hardline 
Yitzhak Shamir of Likud as Prime Minister. With both the new Israeli leadership and the 
PLO leadership frustrated with the lack of progress in the overly public negotiations in 
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Washington, a new secret channel of talks opened up between Israel and the PLO in London 
on December 4, 1992. These negotiations quickly moved to Norway, where they were 
facilitated by the Norwegian government. This resulted in the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, better known as the Oslo Accords, on 
September 13, 1993. The Intifada was officially called off as a result.
204
 
     The goal set forth in the Oslo Accords was the negotiation between Israel and the PLO of 
“a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)” 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
205
 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
242 was passed in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It emphasized that territory 
acquired by force was illegitimate and called for Israeli withdrawal “from territories 
occupied” in the war. In return, UNSCR 242 called for all of Israel‟s neighbors to make 
peace with it and establish demilitarized zones. It also stated that it was necessary to reach “a 
just settlement of the refugee problem.”206 This formula of Israeli military withdrawal from 
territories occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for peace from its Arab neighbors became 
known as the „land for peace‟ formula.207 
     However, interpretation of UNSCR 242 by Israel and its Arab neighbors differed. The 
source of disagreement revolved around the meaning of “from territories occupied.” Israel 
maintained that this did not necessarily mean all territories gained by Israel in the war, while 
the Arab states and the PLO asserted that a full withdrawal was required.
208
 The other 
ambiguity concerning UNSCR 242 was that it did not call for the establishment of a 
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Palestinian state, and it did not specify who is to control the West Bank and Gaza after Israeli 
withdrawal. 
     UNSCR 338 was adopted during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It called for the full 
implementation of UNSCR 242 through negotiations “between the parties concerned.”209 
Again, this resolution was ambiguous about which parties were to negotiate an end to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and to what extent the Palestinians were to be involved. The Oslo 
Accords clarified this point by recognizing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was to be 
resolved between Israel and the PLO.  
     The Oslo Accords called for negotiations on the details of an agreement, referred to as 
permanent status negotiations, to start by the beginning of the third year of an interim period. 
It was clearly stated that the permanent status negotiations were to cover all outstanding 
issues between the parties, including the final status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, 
settlements and final borders, and security arrangements.
210
 
     In sum, the Oslo Accords adopted the „land for peace‟ formula created by UNSCR 242 
and reiterated by UNSCR 338. It did not commit explicitly to Palestinian statehood at the 
time, but as will be seen, this was clearly accepted as the formula later on. The Oslo Accords 
agreed that the permanent status negotiations would cover all issues of conflict between the 
parties, including issues that were recognized as central to the identities of the opposing 
ethnic groups, such as Jerusalem, refugees, and borders. The formula for negotiated 
agreement established in the Oslo Accords was therefore comprehensive, leaving no 
significant issues unresolved. 
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     The Accords provided for the establishment of an interim Palestinian autonomous 
authority. This new Palestinian Authority (PA) was led by the PLO leadership that returned 
from Tunisia. In what were intended to be interim arrangements, the occupied territories 
were divided into three areas. The PA was placed in charge of security and civil 
administration in Area A and civil affairs in Area B. Israel retained security authority in Area 
B and both security and civil duties in Area C.
211
 These transitional arrangements were based 
upon the Framework for Peace document devised in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.
212
 As 
these designations concerned only interim arrangements, my consideration of developments 
in this area will be limited. The focus of the following analysis will be on the permanent 
status negotiations. 
     Although polling indicated that approximately two-thirds of both Israelis and Palestinians 
(within the OPT) supported the Oslo Accords, opposition to the agreement was significant. 
Before the stage of permanent status negotiations was even reached, spoiler violence was at 
work on both sides in an attempt to derail concessions on central identity-based issues. An 
attack by Baruch Goldstein, a radical religious-Zionist settler, killed 29 Muslim worshipers at 
the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994. This massacre led to significant 
Palestinian riots, to which the Israeli military responded violently and killed approximately 
thirty Palestinians and injured hundreds more. The peace process suffered a serious blow on 
November 4, 1995 when Rabin was assassinated at a peace rally in Tel Aviv by Yigal Amir, 
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a 27 year old religious-Zionist motivated by a desire to prevent further territorial concessions 
to the Palestinians.
213
 
     Palestinian militant organizations that were opposed to any territorial compromises over 
historic Palestine and refused to integrate into the PLO and PA carried out many deadly 
attacks against Israeli civilians, killing a far greater number of Israelis after the signing of the 
Oslo Accords than were killed during the Intifada. Hamas was responsible for most of these 
attacks, mainly bus bombings, with Islamic Jihad carrying out several as well. Both groups 
received significant assistance from Iran. Although the Oslo Accords made the PA 
responsible for preventing terrorist activity emanating from areas under its control, this effort 
was very limited so as to avoid damaging Arafat‟s domestic credibility. These attacks led 
large segments of the Israeli public that were previously in favor of concessions to question 
the wisdom of the peace process, and were clearly responsible for Benjamin Netanyahu‟s 
narrow electoral victory over Rabin‟s successor, Shimon Peres, on May 29, 1996. The 
attacks also led Israel to impose stifling security restrictions on the Palestinians, causing 
grave damage to the Palestinian economy and leading to a significant erosion of confidence 
in the peace process.
214
 
     Netanyahu‟s assumption of the Israeli premiership had dire consequences for the peace 
process, which his government essentially set out to derail. After the signing of Oslo, Rabin 
had restricted settlement development in the West Bank to the major settlements near Israel 
proper that Israel intended to keep, a strategy that Arafat had privately accepted. Netanyahu 
initiated plans to dramatically accelerate settlement growth in all of the West Bank and 
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reinstated the monetary incentives for settlement that Rabin had canceled. Ariel Sharon, as 
National Infrastructure Minister, oversaw a massive road building effort to connect 
settlements to Israel and isolate the autonomous Palestinian zones, and invested heavily in 
upgrades to the electricity network and water pipelines. Arafat demanded a halt to 
Netanyahu‟s plans, but he was openly rebuffed.215 
     During Netanyahu‟s premiership, permanent status negotiations were not begun as 
stipulated in the Oslo Accords, and only minor concessions were made on interim 
arrangements. An Israeli withdrawal from part of Hebron was carried out in January 1997, 
and later in the year the Wye River Memorandum was signed. Israel failed to fully 
implement the territorial withdrawals called for in the Wye agreements, and the PA did not 
fulfill the security commitments they were supposed to undertake, although they upheld more 
of their obligations than Israel. Palestinian terrorist attacks continued in 1997, leading to 
further Israeli security restrictions on the occupied territories.
216
 
     On May 17, 1999 Ehud Barak of the Labor Party defeated Netanyahu in the election for 
Israeli Prime Minister. Barak ran on a campaign of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
agreement, and his impeccable military credentials and strong support from an array of 
security officials would enhance his ability to offer territorial concessions in permanent status 
negotiations. The new Knesset (Israel‟s parliament) saw fifteen parties elected. As Labor 
held only 26 of the Knesset‟s 120 seats, Barak needed to attract a broad array of political 
parties in order to form a governing coalition. The Sephardi and Mizrahi ultra-Orthodox 
party Shas was to play a crucial part in Barak‟s coalition with 17 seats, placing limitations on 
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Barak in negotiations regarding Jerusalem. In the coalition agreement, Barak was forced to 
explicitly commit to four principles for a permanent status agreement. These included the 
retention of a unified Jerusalem as the sovereign capital of Israel, no withdrawal to the pre-
1967 borders, no foreign army in the land controlled by the Palestinians, and most settlement 
dwellers remaining in place. Barak also committed to submit the agreement to a 
referendum.
217
 Barak and his negotiation team therefore faced both parliamentary and public 
opinion constraints in reaching a peace agreement. 
     The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum was signed on September 4, 1999, calling for more 
interim steps and setting a timetable for the permanent status negotiations. In the coming 
months, both parties delivered their opening positions. The Palestinians called for a full 
Israeli return to the 1967 borders, but later offered Israeli annexation of four percent of the 
West Bank to be compensated for by an exchange of territory from within Israel proper. 
Israel opened by calling for the annexation of twenty percent of the West Bank and 
subsequently reduced this to 13.3 percent.
218
 
     In Sweden on May 20, 2000, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators developed the Framework 
Agreement on Permanent Status (FAPS) that further clarified the formula to be used. They 
reiterated that United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 would form the 
basis for the agreement. The FAPS explicitly stated that the permanent status agreement 
would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state, a point that had been left ambiguous 
in the Oslo Accords. Israel and Palestine would establish normal diplomatic relations and 
would be prohibited from forming military alliances threatening to either state. It was agreed 
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that all Palestinian prisoners would be released by Israel upon the reaching of a permanent 
status agreement. The parties also discussed the Palestinian refugee issue for the first time, 
agreeing to UNSCR 242 as a basis for doing so. As we have already seen, UNSCR 242 was 
especially vague in this respect, calling only for “a just settlement of the refugee problem.” 
Palestinian negotiators wanted return to Israel with compensation to be an option, while the 
Israelis agreed to compensation but wanted the only options for permanent settlement to be 
Palestine, the refugee‟s current place of residence, or a third country. Israel was also willing 
to accept a limited number of family reunification cases. Later, Palestinian negotiators 
backtracked on the FAPS when leaks of it to the Palestinian press drew criticism.
219
 
     Barak‟s governing coalition began to crumble as soon as a permanent status negotiating 
summit was announced on July 5, 2000. The right-wing National Religious Party and Yisrael 
B‟Aliyah withdrew immediately, and when Barak refused to commit to certain red lines for 
the negotiations the moderate ultra-Orthodox Shas party removed its 17 members, leaving 
the coalition with only 42 seats out of a total of 120. Although Shas supported the concession 
of territory in order to save human life according to the religious principle of pikuach nefesh 
(preservation of life), their position on Jerusalem remained unyielding. Although now in the 
minority, Barak was legally permitted to maintain his office.
220
 
     The Camp David summit was held in Maryland from July 11 to July 25, 2000 with the 
goal of resolving all outstanding issues. The negotiations were mediated by American 
President Bill Clinton and his team and were organized into three issue areas. The first 
concerned issues of borders, territory, settlements, and security (for a short time the issue of 
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security was separated from these other issues but then soon reintegrated), the second was 
Jerusalem, and the third was the Palestinian refugee issue.
221
 In what follows, the 
negotiations on these three issue areas will be examined separately although the negotiators 
moved back and forth between these issues during the summit. 
     Regarding territory, Israel sought to annex enough of the West Bank to incorporate 80 
percent of the settlers in contiguous territorial pieces. They first estimated that this would 
require the annexation of six to eight percent of the West Bank. Clinton backed Israel on this 
goal. Arafat displayed great flexibility, at first expressing the willingness to allow Israel to 
annex as much as eight to ten percent of the West Bank if it was compensated for by an 
exchange of territory from within Israel proper. The Palestinians seemed to quickly 
determine that this was too generous for an initial offer though, and backtracked to 
acceptance of Israeli annexation of three to four percent of the West Bank if compensated for 
by an exchange of territory. They also made clear that West Bank territory annexed by Israel 
should not involve areas with Palestinian population and should not disturb the territorial 
contiguity of the West Bank. The Israelis eventually accepted the principle of exchanging 
territory, but offered rather undesirable land near Gaza.
222
 
     Israel‟s opening offer at Camp David was to annex 10.5 percent of the West Bank and 
retain another ten percent of the West Bank (the Jordan Valley) for security purposes for 
twenty years. They also asked for the retention of five security positions in the West Bank, 
control over airspace, and for Palestine to be a demilitarized state. The Palestinians rejected 
this offer on the grounds that a 10.5 percent annexation was too much and the retention of the 
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Jordan Valley for twenty years was not acceptable. The sides were on full agreement over the 
Gaza Strip, with Israel offering evacuation of all settlements there. During the summit, the 
Palestinians submitted a map to the Israelis of their offer for final borders, allowing some 
settlements to be retained, although not with the territorial buffers around them that Israel 
desired. The settlements that the Palestinians agreed could be annexed by Israel included 
Ariel and the Etzion bloc.
223
 
     Differences between the parties on security issues were not particularly significant. 
Although each side envisioned slightly different wording for how the issue of 
demilitarization of the Palestinian state would be framed, there were no substantive 
differences on the matter. The Palestinians also accepted some American military presence 
on their territory for a certain amount of time and the idea of third party monitoring at border 
posts. The parties were also able to agree on the issue of control over airspace.
224
 These 
security arrangements were derived from the Israeli-Egyptian Framework for Peace 
document.
225
 
     Jerusalem was the dominant issue of the Camp David summit, which was appropriately 
characterized by Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben Ami as “the Jerusalem summit.”226 The 
sovereign status of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was clearly the most contentious 
issue, and debate over it consumed a disproportionate amount of time and attention by the 
negotiators. Arafat felt constrained in his ability to negotiate over it not only by Palestinian 
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public opinion, but based on the belief that the site belongs to all Muslims in the world.
227
 
Arafat told his negotiating team at one point that “The most important thing for me is the 
Haram al-Sharif.”228 On more than one occasion, Arafat made theatrical appeals to Clinton 
that he would be assassinated if he gave up sovereignty over the Haram,
229
 once declaring “I 
won‟t go down in Arab history as a traitor.”230 The Palestinians firmly rejected the possibility 
of any form of shared sovereignty with Israel,
231
 and infuriated the Israelis and Americans by 
rejecting the claim that there had ever been any Jewish connection to the site.
232
 
     The most generous Israeli offer at Camp David was for the Haram al-Sharif/Temple 
Mount to be put under Palestinian custody but with Israel retaining limited sovereignty.
233
 
The Israeli negotiators recognized that for an agreement to be acceptable to their public it 
could not weaken the Israeli claim to the Temple Mount, which in private Israeli discussions 
was described as “the heart of Jewish culture”234 and “the basis of Zionism.”235 The Israeli 
negotiators requested a prayer space for Jews on the Temple Mount, potentially for a 
synagogue. This idea was received with fury by the Palestinian team, and came to represent 
Israel‟s sinister intentions.236 For their part, the Israelis were clearly offended by the 
Palestinian team‟s refusal to even acknowledge that the Temple Mount has significance to 
Jews and to Israel.
237
 So for both sides, the issue of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount 
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created a highly toxic atmosphere at Camp David. 
     Far less discussion revolved around the rest of Jerusalem. The Palestinians demanded 
control over the Christian holy sites as well as the Islamic ones, but were willing to accept 
the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall being under Israeli sovereignty. The Israelis 
proposed Palestinian autonomy over East Jerusalem‟s inner Arab neighborhoods and a 
special administration under Israeli sovereignty for the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian 
quarters within the Old City. The Israelis also expressed their interests in what they termed 
Jerusalem‟s “sacred basin,” (also referred to as the Holy Basin) which included the Jewish 
cemetery on the Mount of Olives and adjoining parts of Jerusalem significant to Judaism that 
predate the walled Old City. On the other hand, Israel was eager to be rid of municipal 
Jerusalem‟s outer Palestinian neighborhoods in order to avoid increasing the number of Arab 
citizens of Israel. The Palestinians agreed to Israeli annexation of Jewish neighborhoods 
established in East Jerusalem after 1967, which included approximately 200,000 Jews.
238
 
     Although the issue did not receive nearly as much attention as Jerusalem, there were 
significant differences between the parties at Camp David concerning the Palestinian refugee 
issue. The Israelis wished for the issue of former Jewish refugees from Arab countries to be 
linked with the Palestinian refugee issue, which the Palestinians were unwilling to accept in 
large part because they played no role in creating the situation. For a large portion of the 
Israeli public, especially Mizrahi Jews and the Shas party, the addressing of Jewish property 
claims was considered a necessity if the claims of Palestinian refugees were to be addressed. 
The Palestinians wanted the Israelis to accept the blame for the creation of the Palestinian 
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refugee situation, and the Israelis insisted that they were not responsible. Both sides simply 
repeated their previous positions on the right of return. The Palestinians insisted that it should 
be up to each individual refugee to decide, and Israel rejected the right of Palestinian 
refugees to return to Israel.
239
 
     At the end of the Camp David summit on July 25, Arafat, Barak, and Clinton agreed to 
continue negotiations with the goal of reaching a final agreement in September. Their 
statements to the press had a damaging effect though, as Barak and to a lesser degree Clinton 
placed the blame for the failure of the summit on Arafat and the Israeli and international 
press agreed with this assessment. Still, public opinion polling demonstrated that most 
Israelis felt that Barak had already compromised too much.
240
 
     After the Camp David summit, secret negotiations were conducted between the 
Palestinians and Israelis. Between July 31 and September 28, 2000, the negotiators met forty 
times. While it was agreed that Israel would compensate Palestine with as much land from 
within Israel proper as it annexed from the West Bank, Barak later backed away from 
commitment to this principle due to the intense parliamentary pressure he was under. 
Negotiation on Jerusalem continued to make little progress. Barak responded very favorably 
to French President Jacques Chirac‟s proposal of shared sovereignty over the entire Old City, 
and also suggested the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty above ground at the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount and Israeli sovereignty below, or alternatively no sovereignty at all for 
the site. The Palestinians were far more rigid in their position, claiming they were unable to 
make any compromise due to religious rulings by all major Islamic authorities in the Arab 
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world. The only alternative the Palestinians offered to their full sovereignty was the full 
sovereignty of the Islamic Conference. Arafat continued to stubbornly refuse to accept that 
the site had any significance whatsoever to Jews.
241
 Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat 
explained the position to the Israeli negotiators by saying “If I don‟t deny what you believe, 
I‟m denying my own religion!” Erekat went on to explain to Enderlin, “This is one of the 
crucial aspects of the misunderstanding: for Islam, there was never a Jewish Temple at Al-
Quds (Jerusalem) but a „distant mosque.‟”242 
     The negotiation process was dealt a significant blow with the outbreak of serious and 
sustained violence beginning in late September 2000. While the cause of the Second Intifada 
has been bitterly disputed between the parties, it can best be attributed to the confluence of 
several factors. First, Palestinians in the occupied territories had grown increasingly restless 
and frustrated by the increased restrictions on movement and damage to the economy caused 
by Israeli security restrictions and continued settlement growth during the peace process. 
Under these conditions, Israeli opposition politician Ariel Sharon of the Likud party visited 
the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on September 28, 2000. The purpose of Sharon‟s visit 
was to demonstrate to Israelis that, unlike Barak, he would never consider ceding sovereignty 
over Judaism‟s holiest site. Palestinian protestors who saw themselves as defending the site 
from attack reacted violently to Sharon‟s visit, and Israel‟s harsh security response led to an 
outburst of violent activity led by the Fatah paramilitary organization Tanzim. Arafat 
calculated that the violence would put additional pressure on Israel to offer greater 
concessions and decided not to exert his power to restrain the militants. The result was a 
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mutual escalation of violence that continued for several years, radicalized both publics, and 
led to the imposition of severe security restrictions on the occupied territories that had a 
devastating effect on Palestinian life.
243
 
     Barak‟s negotiating room was further decreased on November 27 by the passage of a bill 
which stipulated that an absolute majority in the Knesset would be required to make any 
territorial concessions in Jerusalem. Due to the Knesset‟s makeup at the time, this effectively 
made any compromise on the issue impossible.
244
 On December 9 Barak announced his 
resignation to face Sharon for election. The next day negotiations resumed for the first time 
since the Second Intifada‟s outbreak.245 
     On December 23, 2000 President Clinton presented the parties with his proposal of the 
parameters within which an agreement should fall. He determined that 94 to 96 percent of the 
West Bank should go to the Palestinian state with 80 percent of Israeli settlers remaining 
under Israeli sovereignty. Israel would compensate for land annexed by swapping territory 
equal in size to one to three percent of the West Bank and allowing safe passage from the 
West Bank to Gaza. The West Bank would be contiguous, and the areas annexed and the 
number of Palestinians affected would be minimized. An international security presence 
would be stationed in Palestine that could only be withdrawn by mutual consent, and it would 
monitor the agreement‟s implementation. This would provide the credible third party 
guarantee on implementation that has been recognized as a virtual prerequisite and a prime 
indicator of negotiated success. Israel would withdraw from all Palestinian territory except 
the Jordan Valley over a three year period, and then would complete its withdrawal from the 
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Jordan Valley within another three years. Three early warning stations would be placed in the 
West Bank. Palestine would be sovereign over its airspace, but would allow Israeli use of it 
for agreed purposes. Palestine would be termed a “non-militarized” state, but would have a 
strong Palestinian security force and an international force to secure its borders and provide 
deterrence.
246
 
     The Clinton formula for Jerusalem, including within the Old City, was that “Arab areas 
are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli.”247 Two ideas were presented for the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount. Both options called for Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-
Sharif and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall. The difference between the two ideas 
was that under the first Israel would have sovereignty over the sacred space behind the 
Western Wall, and therefore underneath the Haram, where the remains of the Jewish 
Temples were regarded as being, and under the second possibility “functional sovereignty” 
would be shared for this area.
248
 
     For the Palestinian refugee issue, Clinton determined that Israel should acknowledge 
Palestinian suffering caused by the 1948 war (although implicitly not responsibility for it), 
and would assist the international community in addressing the problem.
249
 Clinton‟s position 
on resettlement was much closer to Israel‟s than that of the Palestinians, in that he asserted 
that the solution must be “consistent with the two-state approach...the state of Palestine as the 
homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish 
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people.”250 He suggested that the parties either “recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to 
return to Historic Palestine” or “their Homeland,” as opposed to their homes. Clinton 
suggested five possible final destinations for each refugee: the new state of Palestine, those 
areas currently within Israel that would become part of Palestine in the land swap, their 
current host country, a third country, or Israel. The first two options would be available to all 
Palestinian refugees, and the other three would depend upon the consent of the state 
involved. As a result, UNGAR 194 would be considered by the parties to be implemented.
251
 
     The agreement‟s implementation would result in the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and all its claims would be considered permanently resolved. The United Nations Security 
Council would issue a resolution stating that Resolutions 242 and 338 had been implemented, 
and all Palestinian prisoners would be released.
252
 The Israeli and Palestinian teams both had 
some significant reservations regarding the Clinton proposals, especially over the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount, where both sides maintained their claims of full sovereignty over the 
site.
253
 
     Arafat and Barak gave their teams the go-ahead for one final negotiating session at Taba, 
Egypt, held from January 21 to January 27, 2001. No mediators were used, nor were any 
Americans present. Miguel Moratinos of the European Union was present in an observer 
role, and his account of the talks provides the only nonpartisan insight into what actually 
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occurred there. For the most part, the Clinton parameters were used as the basis for the 
negotiations.
254
 
     Both sides presented maps of their envisioned final borders. Israel wanted to retain six 
percent of the West Bank while the Palestinians offered 3.1 percent. In addition to the 
settlements that the Palestinians already had agreed that Israel could annex, they also 
conceded the large Ma‟ale Adumim settlement but disagreed with Israel over the extent of 
land connecting it to Israel proper. Although both sides accepted the principle of territorial 
exchanges, the issue of proportionality was not agreed to. The parties agreed that the Gaza 
Strip would be under full Palestinian sovereignty.
255
 
     Minor differences remained on security and implementation issues. The wording of how 
Palestine‟s demilitarized status would be framed was not agreed upon. The parties both 
accepted that there would be three early warning stations in the West Bank. The Israeli side 
accepted Clinton‟s proposed withdrawal timetable, but the Palestinians suggested that Israel 
remove its presence from all of the Palestinian state except the Jordan Valley within 18 
months and from the Jordan Valley within an additional ten months. The Palestinians also 
accepted the possibility of international forces being stationed in Palestine for additional 
time.
256
 
     Both sides accepted the Clinton formula for dividing Jerusalem on the basis of Arab 
neighborhoods to Palestine and Jewish neighborhoods to Israel. The parties also agreed that 
in the Old City Palestine would have sovereignty over the entire Muslim and Christian 
quarters and most of the Armenian Quarter, with Israel having sovereignty over the entire 
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Jewish Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter. Israel repeated its interest in retaining 
some control over the Holy Basin, which included the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of 
Olives, the City of David, and the Kidron Valley. Israel was open to shared or international 
control of the area, while the Palestinians wanted full sovereignty but expressed willingness 
to respect Israel‟s concerns in some manner. The Palestinians agreed to Israeli control of the 
Western Wall, but disagreed over what the extent of the Western Wall actually was. Most 
significantly, the issue of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was not resolved.
257
 
     On the issue of Palestinian refugees, both sides accepted that the just settlement called for 
in UNSCR 242 must implement UNGAR 194. However, there was a fundamental 
disagreement as to the meaning of UNGAR 194, with the Palestinians asserting that it 
guaranteed every individual refugee the right of return while the Israelis did not interpret it as 
guaranteeing return. So despite agreement to this referent, the Palestinians continued to stress 
that each refugee would have the free choice to return to their home within Israel, while the 
Israelis reiterated Clinton‟s five options. The Israelis also accepted the idea of admitting a 
very limited number of refugees in addition to the family reunification cases they had offered 
earlier, and considered expressing regret for the creation of the refugee problem. While some 
sources claimed that certain Palestinian negotiators suggested limiting the number of 
returning refugees to somewhere between 150,000 and 1,500,000, Moratinos insisted that the 
Palestinians never presented any numbers.
258
 
     Although the positions of the parties moved closer together at Taba, it was agreed that 
with the Israeli election coming so soon it would be inappropriate to reach a final agreement 
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even if it were possible. The sides therefore agreed to end negotiations and issue a positive 
public statement.
259
 On February 6, 2001 Ariel Sharon won the greatest landslide victory in 
Israeli history, taking over 62 percent of the vote. The outbreak of the Second Intifada had 
critically undermined Israeli support for the peace process and had validated the Israeli right, 
which had argued that the Palestinians should not be armed as they would turn their weapons 
against Israel. Sharon chose to discontinue the negotiation process and significantly escalated 
the violent assault on the Palestinians. The peace process had come to a decisive end.
260
 
The Impact of Inclusion Versus Postponement in Israel-Palestine 
     Reviewing the different elements of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian identity, certain 
elements proved to pose significant barriers to an agreement according to the formula agreed 
upon by the parties while others did not. I will address each of these issues of Jewish Israeli 
and Palestinian identity and utilize counterfactual analysis where appropriate. 
     First, the Israeli sacred value of the Jewish state was not threatened under the formula 
agreed upon in the Oslo Accords, that being the „land for peace‟ formula of UNSCR 242. By 
calling for territorial partition in Israel-Palestine, Israel would be able to maintain a Jewish 
state. The other possible formula for restructuring power relations as was necessary to 
resolve the conflict would have been to create a unified power-sharing government. 
However, this would have violated the central identity-based value of Jewish Israelis, 
maintaining a Jewish state. While never openly stated, it can be assumed that this is the 
reason why the Israel government and public did not consider this option. 
     The central identity-based value of a significant minority of Israeli Jews, Israeli control 
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over the entire Land of Israel, was clearly violated by the Oslo formula. Although the level of 
Israeli resistance to territorial concessions was not significant enough to bring down the 
peace process democratically, some highly significant acts of spoiler violence did result. The 
most significant of these was the assassination of Rabin. Violation of this value was simply 
unavoidable under any formula that could have been acceptable to a sufficient percentage of 
the Palestinian population and restructured power relations though. Even assurances that a 
peace agreement would not have resulted in the removal of settlers would have been 
insufficient, as the critical element of this value was Jewish control over the Land, not simply 
a Jewish presence in it. Therefore, despite the danger that violating this value posed, it was 
necessary in order to resolve the most fundamental cause of the Intifada. 
     It is more questionable whether or not the Oslo formula based upon UNSCR 242 violated 
the Palestinian identity-based value of regaining all of historic Palestine. This is largely 
dependent on whether one viewed the achievement of a Palestinian state beside Israel as a 
permanent renunciation of claims over the rest of historic Palestine or as a step toward the 
recovery of the entire land. Defining the purpose of the agreement as reaching a “permanent 
status” may have violated this value for some Palestinians, and therefore eliminating that 
terminology from the negotiation formula may have reduced Palestinian opposition and 
spoiler violence. While the fact that many Palestinians would have viewed the establishment 
of a Palestinian state beside Israel as only a step on the path to recovering all of historic 
Palestine may have been unsettling to many Israelis, it should be recognized that such 
Palestinian aspirations would have been largely inconsequential due to Israel‟s overwhelming 
military advantage. It also does not appear possible that any alteration to this formula would 
85 
 
have reduced Palestinian rejectionist opposition. 
     The wisdom of including a permanent resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue amongst 
the necessary issues to be resolved was highly questionable. The Israeli value of maintaining 
a Jewish state and the Palestinian right of return, as it was traditionally defined, were 
mutually exclusive. By accepting a two-state formula, it was implicit that the right of return 
could not be implemented as it fundamentally violated the principle of each ethnic group 
having their own state. However, it is clear that the Palestinian people were not prepared to 
concede or reinterpret the right of return. Including the Palestinian refugee issue for 
permanent resolution undermined support for the peace process amongst both ethnic publics. 
Palestinian insistence on allowing the return of refugees convinced Israelis that Palestinians 
were unwilling to accept the existence of the Jewish state,
261
 and it has been suggested that 
one of the motivations for the Second Intifada was the fear of Palestinian refugees that the 
right of return was going to be forfeited.
262
 
     However, simply postponing the refugee issue for later consideration would likely have 
been acceptable to both sides. For Jewish Israelis their central value of maintaining a Jewish 
state would have been honored, and Palestinians would not have been forced to concede the 
demand for a right of return that was so vital to their identity. It should be recognized that 
failing to permanently resolve the refugee issue would not mean leaving Palestinian refugees 
languishing in camps in their existing desperate circumstances. The establishment of a 
Palestinian state would have created a practical solution to the plight of the refugees, as all 
Palestinians would have inevitably been allowed to live there. It is important to note that 
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when UNSCR 242 was drafted it was not assumed that an Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territories would result in the creation of a Palestinian state. Therefore, a permanent 
resolution of the refugee issue may have been necessary at that time, but was not when the 
establishment of a Palestinian state was agreed to during the Oslo process. Under this 
counterfactual scenario, those with refugee status would not have been forced to forfeit their 
claims, but at the same time Israel would have been able to maintain the existence of the 
Jewish state and their rejection of the right of return. In sum, it appears that including the 
refugee issue for permanent resolution contributed to the failure to reach an agreement, while 
postponing the issue would have facilitated it. 
     The most problematic identity-based issue addressed in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
was the sovereign status of Jerusalem. The fact that what was of greatest importance to the 
identity of each side in this respect was exactly the same became obvious at the Camp David 
summit. The issue of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount dominated the negotiations, and the 
Palestinian denial of the site‟s sanctity to Jews and the Israeli insistence on renewing Jewish 
prayer at the site created a highly toxic atmosphere between the negotiators and the opposing 
societies. Furthermore, Sharon‟s provocative walk on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif 
would have been devoid of meaning and would therefore not have occurred if the sovereign 
status of the site was not being negotiated at the time. The negotiation of this issue therefore 
played a critical role in the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the collapse of the peace 
process. 
     Some scholars have suggested that the Israeli and Palestinian claims over Jerusalem are 
actually quite reconcilable. As there are areas of municipal Jerusalem that Israeli Jews are 
87 
 
willing to concede and other areas that Palestinians do not covet, it has been argued that each 
side could simply redefine Jerusalem in a manner that would create two separate 
municipalities.
263
 What these scholars fail to recognize is that there are limits to the extent to 
which identity-based values can be reinterpreted. The conflict over Jerusalem is not a vague 
dispute over the city‟s residential neighborhoods. Unfortunately, both sides want the exact 
same thing in Jerusalem, most of all sovereign control over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple 
Mount. The failed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations made this abundantly clear, and it should 
have also been clear before the inherently flawed formula of permanently resolving 
Jerusalem‟s status was agreed upon in the Oslo Accords. Barak accurately portrayed the 
Israeli limitation on concessions in Jerusalem when he stated, “No Israeli prime minister will 
ever confer exclusive sovereignty over the Temple Mount [on the Palestinians]. It‟s been the 
cradle and the heart of the identity of the Jewish people for 3,000 years.”264 Palestinian 
negotiator Yasser Abed Rabbo similarly articulated the Palestinian limitations on conceding 
sovereignty over the site when he explained, “If we were to yield on this issue, we‟d risk 
being accused of treason by the entire Muslim community.”265 Ignoring the parties‟ 
contradictory claims did not cause them to disappear, nor would it in the future. 
     Rather than seeking to resolve holy Jerusalem‟s sovereign status once and for all, a more 
appropriate formula would have been to agree to resolve the territorial and security issues in 
the occupied territories that were necessary to address the essential issue of restructuring 
power relations while postponing permanent resolution of the issue of sovereign status in 
Jerusalem‟s Holy Basin. Under this formula, the status quo would have remained in place in 
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the interim with Israel retaining de facto sovereignty, but without its control internationally 
recognized and with the Palestinians maintaining their claims. While it is certainly preferable 
to resolve all outstanding issues through negotiation if possible, the critical issue that needed 
to be resolved between the Israelis and Palestinians was the restructuring of power relations, 
not sovereignty over Jerusalem‟s holy sites. Even in the likely scenario that an agreement 
resolving claims over Jerusalem‟s holy sites would not have been reached after 
postponement, violent conflict would have been unlikely to reoccur with power relations 
restructured and a Palestinian state established. In sum, putting the issue of Jerusalem on the 
agenda for permanent resolution in the formula phase was absolutely critical to the failure of 
negotiations in the detail phase, while postponing the issue would likely have facilitated 
agreement on the critical issue of restructuring power relations between the parties. 
     On the most critical issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the restructuring of the highly 
unequal relationship in the occupied territories, the differences between the two parties 
proved to be minor. Skeptics could point to the high initial offer by the Israelis as evidence 
that they were unwilling to make the necessary concessions in this area, but it could better be 
explained as smart bargaining strategy.
266
 The parties‟ final positions are a far better 
indication of the compromises they were willing to make, as is Arafat‟s early claim that he 
was willing to accept Israeli annexation of eight to ten percent of the West Bank if 
compensated for by swapped land. Both sides agreed on which significant settlements would 
be annexed to Israel and that Israel would compensate the Palestinians with land from within 
Israel proper. The gap that remained at Taba was minor, revolving around the precise amount 
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of West Bank land that Israel would incorporate in order to connect the annexed settlements 
to Israel proper and the specific pieces of land to be swapped. While it is impossible to 
determine conclusively, it appears likely that an agreement could have been reached that 
would have resolved this problem if the issues of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees had 
been postponed until after the issue of territory was addressed. 
     In sum, a review of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations utilizing counterfactual analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the decision to include the central identity-based issues of 
Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees for permanent resolution during the formula phase was 
critical to the failure of the process, while postponement of these issues would likely have 
allowed a successful outcome. Therefore, the inclusion for permanent resolution or 
postponement of central identity-based issues had a dramatic impact on the outcome of the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process. 
Case 2: The Northern Ireland Negotiation Process 
     The first attempt made to restore order to Northern Ireland was a settlement imposed by 
Britain in 1973 that the SDLP, the cross-community Alliance Party, and much of the 
Unionist Party accepted. The main components of the agreement were that Northern Ireland 
would remain part of the United Kingdom as long as a majority of the province‟s people 
desired, a new assembly using PR would replace the Northern Ireland Parliament, an 
executive would be established with power-sharing between parties representing both 
communities, and the Republic of Ireland would be given a voice in the North‟s affairs 
through the establishment of a Council of Ireland. Elections for the assembly were held on 
June 28, 1973, with pro-agreement parties winning a clear majority. The Sunningdale 
90 
 
Agreement was finalized on December 9, 1973, and the SDLP, Alliance, and most of the 
Unionist Party formed the power-sharing executive and entered government on January 1, 
1974.
267
 
     The new government soon collapsed though as the result of a loyalist general strike in 
May 1974. The main complaint of those unionists who opposed the Agreement was in 
regards to the Council of Ireland, which they saw as a step toward the unification of Ireland. 
The key element of the two week loyalist strike was a reduction of electricity output that 
brought industry to a standstill. The British Army declined to take serious action against the 
strikers, and Unionist members of the executive resigned on May 28, 1974. The British 
government suspended the new Northern Ireland Assembly the following day and direct 
British rule was subsequently imposed.
268
 Britain made a few unsuccessful attempts at 
encouraging a diplomatic solution to the conflict in the following years, but the main focus 
was on keeping Northern Ireland‟s economy running and reducing violence.269 
     Beginning in the early 1980s, John Hume of the SDLP argued that the Northern Ireland 
question should be resolved in what came to be known as three “strands.” The first strand 
would create a new power-sharing arrangement between unionists and nationalists in 
Northern Ireland. The second strand would establish institutional arrangements between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The purpose of the third stand was to create a 
new body addressing issues within the islands of Ireland and Great Britain.
270
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     The Anglo-Irish Agreement was made between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland on November 15, 1985 regarding the future of Northern Ireland. The two 
governments agreed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom until a 
majority of the province‟s people wished to join the Republic of Ireland.271 This formula for 
Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status became known as the consent principal,272 but can also be 
thought of as repeatable plebiscites on sovereign status. While not ignoring the existence of 
the sectarian dispute regarding sovereign status, the governments of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom decided that permanent resolution of the question should be postponed. Plebiscites 
within Northern Ireland would be the mechanism by which the issue would be addressed in 
the future. The Union would be preserved for the time being, but Irish Catholics could 
maintain their hopes of achieving a united Ireland. While Ulster Protestants would certainly 
have been more reassured if their place in the Union were permanently secured, ultimately 
their core identity-based desire was not violated. And while Irish republicans clearly wanted 
to achieve the unity of the island immediately, they did not have to forfeit the content of their 
identity. The higher Catholic birthrate made the goal of a united Ireland appear achievable in 
the future through democratic means.
273
 
     The Anglo-Irish Agreement also stated that Northern Ireland should have a devolved 
government within the United Kingdom, and that a return to this status must be achieved 
with the cooperation of both communities in the province and in a way acceptable to both.
274
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The Agreement also called for cross-border cooperation in a number of areas between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland whether devolution was or was not achieved.
275
 
     The Anglo-Irish Agreement marked the beginning of genuine cooperation on the Northern 
Ireland issue between the British and Irish governments.
276
 The Agreement was strongly 
opposed by unionists, with the new Ulster Clubs organizing a united front and Paisley 
leading the “Ulster Says No” campaign. Again, the unionist opposition focused on the 
involvement of the Republic in the North‟s affairs, which was feared was a step toward Irish 
unity. Loyalist paramilitaries responded with increased violence.
277
 Republicans were also 
displeased with the Irish government for formally conceding to the consent principle, but 
most nationalists were supportive.
278
 The Agreement put pressure on the parties within 
Northern Ireland to participate in negotiating a settlement because the United Kingdom and 
Ireland threatened to force a new arrangement upon them if they did not.
279
 
     Peter Brooke, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced an initiative 
to explore the potential for negotiations amongst Northern Ireland‟s constitutional political 
parties in January 1990. Until the PIRA was willing to give up violence Sinn Féin would not 
be allowed to participate, nor would loyalist parties affiliated with paramilitary groups. 
Brooke adopted the three strand formula created by Hume and was able to convince the 
British and Irish governments, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Paisley‟s Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), Alliance, and, of course, the SDLP to accept it as the basis for talks 
beginning on April 30, 1991. The unionists sought to be rid of the consent principle agreed 
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upon by Britain and Ireland in 1985 and have Northern Ireland‟s place in the United 
Kingdom made permanent as the price for agreeing to internal compromise. The SDLP, 
representing Irish Catholics, was unwilling to forfeit the prospect of eventually achieving a 
united Ireland and considered the Anglo-Irish Agreement the basis for any future settlement. 
The talks ended on July 3, 1991 because the unionist parties refused to continue as Britain 
and Ireland committed to proceeding with an Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 
later that month. The failure of the talks was followed by an escalation of violence by loyalist 
and republican paramilitaries.
280
 
     The Downing Street Declaration was issued by British Prime Minister John Major and 
Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) Albert Reynolds on December 15, 1993, reinforcing and 
elaborating on the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. Specifically, it recommitted to the consent 
principle for sovereign status, a new devolved government within Northern Ireland, cross-
border institutions for the island of Ireland, and a new institution encompassing the British 
Isles, including Ireland.
281
 The Irish government committed to examine and look to rectify 
those elements of itself which made the Republic threatening and offensive to unionists, and 
to support amendment of its constitution to reflect its commitment to the consent principle if 
an overall settlement were reached.
282
 Paramilitary groups were called upon to end their use 
of violence, and an invitation was extended to all political parties in Northern Ireland to 
participate in the diplomatic process on the condition that they commit to pursue their 
objectives through exclusively peaceful means.
283
 As with the 1985 Agreement, both 
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unionists and republicans were displeased with the new Declaration. Ulster Protestants were 
particularly alarmed that the new language defined the people of Northern Ireland as part of 
the people of Ireland.
284
 
     Under President Bill Clinton the United States played an important role in resolving the 
Northern Ireland conflict. Clinton was the first American president to make resolution of the 
conflict a high priority. Although it angered the British government tremendously at the time, 
Clinton‟s decision to allow Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams entry into the United States in 
January 1994 proved to be highly beneficial. The visit validated Sinn Féin as a legitimate 
participant in the search for a negotiated solution and demonstrated to PIRA members that 
more could be accomplished through diplomacy than continued violence. In addition to 
realizing that it would not be possible to force British withdrawal, the PIRA also faced strong 
pressure from within the Irish Catholic community to end their violent campaign. On August 
31, 1994 the PIRA declared a cease-fire, which was reciprocated by the loyalist 
paramilitaries in October.
285
 
     Ten parties, including all significance players, were eligible to participate in negotiations 
chaired by former United States Senator George Mitchell that began on June 10, 1996. As 
Major had committed in September 1994, any agreement that would come from these talks 
would have to be accepted by the parties in Northern Ireland, the people of Northern Ireland 
in a referendum, and the British Parliament. Although the decommissioning of partisan 
militias was rejected as a precondition for entry to the talks, each party was required to 
commit to principles of nonviolence and eventual disarmament. It was accepted that making 
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decommissioning a precondition for talks had already delayed the process for more than a 
decade. The Mitchell Principles excluded parties on both sides of Northern Ireland‟s political 
divide at times, including Sinn Féin and the loyalist Ulster Democratic Party. The DUP and 
the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), in competition for rejectionist Protestant 
support, also did not fully participate in the talks. In July 1997 the two parties exited for 
good. Extremists that were not affiliated with any of the participating parties also tried to 
derail the negotiations through terrorist violence, but these attempts were fairly limited.
286
 
     Tony Blair of the Labour Party became the new British Prime Minister in May 1997. Blair 
had considerably more room to pressure the UUP because, unlike Major‟s government, he 
was not dependent upon their parliamentary support. Blair saw his role as one of a neutral 
facilitator and mediator who would seek to reconcile the two sides within the province. 
Bertie Ahern became the new Irish Taoiseach in June 1997 and cooperated well with Blair on 
resolving the conflict. The leaders put additional pressure on the parties within Northern 
Ireland to come to a compromise agreement by threatening to work out a settlement without 
them and bring it to the voters in referendums in the North and South of Ireland.
287
 
     The negotiations utilized the three strand formula that has already been discussed, and the 
parties would maintain their disagreement over Northern Ireland‟s proper sovereign status 
and adopt the consent principle for revisiting the issue in the future. The formula for a 
Northern Ireland peace agreement was made somewhat more detailed with the January 12, 
1998 Heads of Agreement that was issued by the British and Irish governments. In addition 
to reiterating the three strands and the consent principle, the governments also noted that the 
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issues of decommissioning, security, policing, and political prisoners would need to be 
addressed and made clear their intention to make the appropriate changes to the Irish 
Constitution and British law to reflect acceptance of the consent principle. Although they had 
privately acknowledged it earlier, Sinn Féin responded to the Heads of Agreement by 
publicly accepting for the first time that the negotiations would not result in a united Ireland, 
eliminating the last opponent to the consent principle and leaving Northern Ireland‟s long-
term sovereign status indeterminate.
288
 
     The substantive negotiations over the details of the three strands began in October 1997. It 
was clear that a resolution of Strand One, the creation of new institutions within Northern 
Ireland, would have to result in the establishment of power-sharing between the two 
communities. Without power-sharing there would be no way to ensure that Northern Ireland 
would not simply revert to the majoritarian dictatorship that was central to the creation of the 
conflict. The UUP and the SDLP, as the largest parties for their respective communities, 
would negotiate the Strand One issues directly after Strand Two was agreed upon.
289
 
     Strand Two addressed the development of North-South bodies for the island of Ireland. In 
addition to being important to Northern Catholics, especially republicans, the Irish 
government also viewed the establishment of cross-border institutions as compensation for 
its agreement to concede its constitutional claim to the North. Of the three stands, Strand 
Two was by far the most difficult to reach agreement on as unionists feared that these bodies 
would be the precursor of a united Ireland. The new all-Ireland institutions were negotiated 
directly by Ahern and Blair, but the parties within Northern Ireland needed to approve what 
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the two leaders agreed upon. After much difficulty, Ahern and Blair were able to reach an 
agreement, but the UUP angrily rejected the proposal due to the explicitly independent nature 
of the cross-border bodies. The Prime Ministers therefore revised their proposal with the goal 
of making the new institutions more acceptable to unionists without losing nationalist 
support. A North/South Ministerial Council would be established that would bring together 
the executives of the two governments to coordinate policies on issues such as agriculture, 
transportation, and tourism. The key to mutual agreement was making the functioning of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the North/South Ministerial Council interdependent so as to 
guarantee unionists that the cross-border institutions would not function unless the Assembly 
was in place and to guarantee nationalists that the new Assembly would not be established 
and the North-South bodies discarded. Both sides were able to accept this compromise. The 
creation of all-Ireland institutions was a major concession for Ulster Protestants to make.
290
 
     With Strand Two resolved, leaders of the UUP and the SDLP directly negotiated Strand 
One issues. Without any meaningful difficulties they were able to quickly agree upon power-
sharing arrangements for the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The Assembly would be 
elected by proportional representation with committee membership, chairmanship, and 
ministerial appointments to be determined in accordance with party strength. Key decisions 
would require a measure of support from both communities. An Executive would be 
established based upon principles of power-sharing between the two communities and party 
strength.
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     Strand Three addressed the establishment of a new body that would coordinate on issues 
within the British Isles and was intended to counterbalance the North/South Ministerial 
Council. This was essentially a symbolic gesture used to reassure unionists and was not at all 
controversial. Negotiations over the details of Strand Three were apparently brief and 
uneventful as the insider accounts did not even mention their occurrence. A British-Irish 
Council would be established that would bring together representatives of Britain, the 
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel 
Islands to discuss ways of cooperating on issues similar to those addressed by the 
North/South Ministerial Council. A British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference would also 
be established that would allow the Irish government to give input to Britain regarding 
Northern Ireland matters not devolved to the province‟s government and to facilitate cross-
border cooperation within the island over issues that were not devolved to the North such as 
security.
292
 
     With the approval of the relevant parties, the Good Friday Agreement
293
 was announced 
on April 10, 1998, and it was to be subject to approval by referendums in both the North and 
South of Ireland.
294
 Regarding the issue of Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status, the consent 
principle was reaffirmed with plebiscites on the issue not to occur more frequently than every 
seven years.
295
 Tony Blair‟s chief negotiator accurately referred to the Agreement as “an 
agreement to disagree,” as Ulster Protestants maintained their commitment to upholding 
Northern Ireland‟s place in the United Kingdom and Irish Catholics still sought the 
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unification of Ireland.
296
 The Agreement openly stated that “We acknowledge the substantial 
differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations.”297 
However, the parties agreed to pursue their aspirations through peaceful means. Although 
accepting the consent principle was particularly difficult for republicans, the Agreement in 
no way signaled a concession of the aspiration to achieve Irish unity.
298
 
     The right of Northern Ireland‟s people to hold both British and Irish citizenship was 
recognized and would remain in effect if Northern Ireland were to eventually become part of 
a united Ireland. This would enable those of Irish identity in the North to participate in the 
Republic‟s institutions and provide a critical safeguard to Ulster Protestants should Irish 
unification eventually occur. The Irish and British governments also committed to making 
the appropriate changes to the Irish Constitution and British law regarding Northern Ireland‟s 
sovereign status to reflect agreement to the consent principle.
299
 
     Commitments to human rights were made, notably upholding the right to seek change to 
Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status through peaceful means and calling for equal 
employment opportunities. Progress toward reconciliation was urged, but commitments in 
this area were vague. Ambiguous appeals were also made for the protection of the Irish and 
Ulster-Scots languages and the creation of symbols and emblems that would respect the 
sensitivities of both communities. The demand for recognition of the Irish language had been 
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an important point for Sinn Féin, and recognition of the Ullans dialect helped moderate 
Protestant concerns in this respect.
300
 
     The Agreement contained various provisions that could be seen as falling under the rubric 
of security. The parties reaffirmed their intention to decommission weapons, with the goal of 
completing this task within two years of the Agreement‟s approval through referendum. The 
plan for accomplishing this was left vague, and the two year date was presented as an 
aspiration rather than a deadline. These commitments were left ambiguous in order to win the 
approval of Sinn Féin. However, as a reassurance to unionists, it was implied that a failure to 
decommission weapons could result in exclusion or removal from office. Tony Blair also 
gave the UUP additional written assurances in a letter that a delay in PIRA decommissioning 
could result in Sinn Féin not being allowed to enter the government.
301
 
     The British government committed to demilitarize its security presence in Northern 
Ireland and remove emergency powers, but again it was left ambiguous as to how soon this 
would occur as it would be contingent upon a reduced threat level.
302
 The goal of creating a 
police force and criminal justice system that is nonpartisan and representative of Northern 
Ireland‟s community make-up was agreed upon, but the details for accomplishing this were 
left particularly vague with reviews being called for to provide recommendations for later 
consideration. The possibility of devolving policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland‟s 
government was left open.
303
 Commitments were also made for the early release of prisoners 
affiliated with paramilitary groups that had ceased violent activity. This provision was of 
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critical importance to both republicans and loyalists, and although it was offensive to 
unionists they were able to concede it as to them the issue was of secondary concern.
304
 
     The Agreement called for two referendums to be held on May 22, 1998. Within Northern 
Ireland voters would be asked to support or reject the Agreement, and in the Republic of 
Ireland voters would be asked to approve changes to the Irish Constitution reflecting 
acceptance of the consent principle for the North‟s sovereign status. With majority approval 
in both referendums, the British and Irish governments would take the necessary steps to 
bring the terms of the Agreement into effect. Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
would then be held on June 25, 1998, after which all bodies called for in the Agreement 
would be established.
305
 
     Ian Paisley led the unionist campaign against the Agreement even before it was officially 
reached, although its impact was muted by loyalist participation in the process and support 
for the Agreement. The Agreement led to division within the UUP, with some of its 
parliamentarians joining in the campaign to vote no on the referendum. Opposition to the 
Agreement amongst Northern Catholics was far more limited. This was clear before the 
referendum when Sinn Féin delegates voted at their convention to change their policy on 
abstentionism to the Northern Ireland Assembly by a vote count of 331 to 19. A small 
percentage of republicans did oppose the Agreement though as it failed to immediately result 
in Irish unification, and dissidents formed the 32 Counties Sovereignty Committee and the 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) in protest.
306
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     The referendums were held on May 22, 1998. In the South, 94 percent approved. While a 
simple majority was all that was technically required to approve the Agreement within 
Northern Ireland, it was recognized that in order for the Agreement to be seen as credible it 
would need to win a majority within both communities. With 81 percent of eligible voters 
participating, 71 percent voted in favor. The difference was significant between the two 
communities though, as 96 percent of Catholics approved compared to 55 percent of 
Protestants. The creation of cross-border institutions within the island of Ireland made the 
Agreement particularly difficult for unionists to swallow.
307
 
     The elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly were held as called for on June 25. 
The UUP remained the largest party, but its vote share declined in comparison to past 
elections and the DUP gained, demonstrating widespread Protestant opposition to the newly 
approved agreement. Sinn Féin gained considerably, as a vote for the party was no longer a 
vote for continuing the conflict, but the SDLP remained the largest nationalist party.
308
 
     Protestants upset with the Good Friday Agreement attempted to use their annual parades 
in the summer of 1998 to derail its implementation. Although parade violence had been a 
regular occurrence in the past, especially in the previous three years, the 1998 disturbances 
were the most significant and dangerous to the peace process. Controversy centered on the 
Drumcree march, in which Protestants were prohibited that year from taking their traditional 
provocative route through a Catholic area. As part of a violent protest campaign, Protestant 
rioters carried out an arson attack that killed three Catholic children on July 12, 1998. The 
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tragic incident disgusted even most supporters of the march, and as a result the controversy 
died down and the effort to derail the peace process failed.
309
 
     The next attempt to derail the Good Friday Agreement came on August 15, 1998 when the 
RIRA detonated a bomb in Omagh, killing 29 and injuring hundreds. Although many 
republicans were unhappy with compromises made by Sinn Féin and the PIRA, the fact that 
the attack‟s victims were civilians rather than police officers or soldiers all but destroyed the 
RIRA‟s credibility. Sinn Féin‟s leadership harshly condemned the attack, and by September 
7 the RIRA announced a complete ceasefire. From that point on, the RIRA posed little threat 
to the implementation of the peace agreement.
310
 
     After the signing and approval by referendum of the Good Friday Agreement, the 
constructive ambiguity used in order to gain republican approval regarding the issue of 
paramilitary decommissioning caused serious problems in its implementation. The 
fundamental dilemma was that the PIRA refused to disarm without the implementation of the 
power-sharing Executive, while the UUP would not enter into the power-sharing Executive 
without PIRA disarmament. Sinn Féin‟s leadership was also convinced that PIRA 
decommissioning needed to be delayed in order to avoid a split within the republican 
movement, but this slowed down the process significantly. Adams and Sinn Féin‟s chief 
negotiator Martin McGuinness privately committed to PIRA disarmament, but were 
unwilling to make such pronouncements publicly. Both communities became restless about 
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the other side‟s unwillingness to implement their end of the bargain, and Sinn Féin and the 
UUP continued to demand that the other take the first step.
311
 
     In November 1999, Sinn Féin and the UUP were finally able to reach a compromise on 
moving ahead with decommissioning. This led to the establishment of the Northern Ireland 
Executive on November 29. Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland were repealed, 
and on December 2 the first meeting of the Executive was held. Later in December, the 
British-Irish Council called for in Strand Three met for the first time. By the end of the 
month the progress started to unravel though as Sinn Féin backtracked on its commitment to 
PIRA decommissioning. This led to the suspension of the Executive in February 2000.
312
 
     In May 2000 Sinn Féin and the UUP agreed to restore devolved rule and reestablish the 
Executive. The British Army carried out some demilitarization and the PIRA responded by 
dumping some weapons. However, the slow progress led to increasingly firm stances within 
both communities. This was made evident in the June 2001 UK general elections which saw 
significantly increased representation for both the DUP and Sinn Féin at the expense of the 
UUP and the SDLP. This only encouraged Sinn Féin to slow the decommissioning 
process.
313
 A major shift in Sinn Féin thinking occurred, however, as a result of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The attacks resulted in serious 
pressure against the PIRA as global resolve against terrorism hardened. In October, the PIRA 
decommissioned a significant amount of their weaponry.
314
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     PIRA activities continued though, further souring Protestant attitudes toward the Good 
Friday Agreement. A police raid on Sinn Féin‟s Stormont offices on October 4, 2002 turned 
up materials regarding the targeting of Northern Ireland police officers. The province‟s 
institutions were suspended once again on October 15, bringing the return of direct British 
rule. The PIRA finally carried out another act of decommissioning in October 2003, but 
would not allow the third party monitor to announce exactly what had happened. The 
ambiguity of the event greatly eroded unionist confidence in the PIRA‟s commitment to 
decommissioning.
315
 
     Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly on November 26, 2003 made the DUP and 
Sinn Féin the largest parties within their respective communities. Although this led to initial 
skepticism about the prospects for the restoration of devolved rule, in February 2004 the 
DUP expressed willingness to share power with Sinn Féin if they took sufficient steps to end 
PIRA paramilitarism and criminality, carry out decommissioning, and accept changes to 
Strands One and Two of the Good Friday Agreement.
316
 Soon Sinn Féin and the DUP started 
secret contacts through a journalist intermediary, and British diplomats shuttled back and 
forth between the two parties. All parties agreed to seek resolution to the issues highlighted 
by the DUP. Sinn Féin warned, however, that the PIRA would not be able to recover all of 
the weapons that they once had as some were in the hands of the RIRA.
317
 
     Sinn Féin‟s trustworthiness was severely undermined in the eyes of unionists as the result 
of a large bank robbery perpetrated by the PIRA in December 2004. The PIRA‟s credibility 
was also damaged within their own community as a result of the February 14, 2005 killing of 
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republican Robert McCartney. After his family bravely spoke out against PIRA violence, the 
organization further degraded their image by openly threatening to shoot McCartney‟s 
killers. As a result, the PIRA faced both internal and external pressure to finalize their 
transition to democratic politics through Sinn Féin. Gerry Adams made an appeal to the 
PIRA on April 6, 2005, arguing that republican violence had become counterproductive and 
Sinn Féin was now a better path toward the achievement of their political objectives. The 
PIRA undertook unilateral decommissioning, and on September 26 the independent monitor 
confirmed that all of their weapons were beyond use.
318
 
     With PIRA disarmament complete, Paisley was ready to move forward to the negotiation 
of a final agreement with Sinn Féin to restore Northern Ireland‟s devolved government. Talks 
began October 11 in St. Andrews, Scotland. A large number of changes were made to 
Strands One, Two, and Three of the Good Friday Agreement, but they were all highly 
technical and mundane, and therefore unworthy of a detailed discussion for our purposes. 
Various commitments were also made on other issues, most notably in regards to the Irish 
and Ulster Scots languages. The details of policing and justice devolution were left 
unresolved. On October 13, 2006 the St. Andrews Agreement was reached.
319
 In reality, what 
was new in the text of the St. Andrews Agreement was of very little significance. The major 
differences between the Good Friday Agreement and St. Andrews were the participation of 
the DUP and the fact that PIRA decommissioning had been accomplished. In the end, the 
DUP‟s part in the agreement made peace in Northern Ireland more stable than it would have 
been if an agreement was concluded by the UUP, as now all major parties had signed on. 
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     The St. Andrews Agreement did not mark the end of negotiations, as some minor details 
still remained to be resolved. Most of these items were resolved in the following month. In 
late January 2007 the PIRA and Sinn Féin agreed to cooperate with the police, and Adams 
encouraged republicans to join the force. Elections were held to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on March 7, 2007, with the DUP and Sinn Féin maintaining their dominant 
positions within their respective communities. On March 23, three days before the scheduled 
reestablishment of the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP decided to delay going into 
government until May in order to avoid splitting the party. Blair asked the DUP to meet face-
to-face with Sinn Féin for the first time ever and agree with them to the postponement. For 
their part, Sinn Féin was also interested in getting their own concessions on terrorist trials 
and an Irish language act. The parties agreed to meet and Blair committed to act on Sinn 
Féin‟s two points.320 
     The public nature of the meeting between Adams and Paisley provided a valuable symbol 
that the long conflict was truly at an end. The swearing in ceremony proceeded on May 8, 
2007, with Paisley as First Minister and McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. Both gave 
gracious speeches and shook hands, inaugurating a new era in Northern Ireland politics.
321
 In 
January 2010 the last major paramilitary group disarmed. At the time of writing, the issue of 
policing and justice devolution is still unresolved and a few small incidents of dissident 
republican violence have occurred,
322
 but it appears that for all intents and purposes the 
Northern Ireland conflict is over. 
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The Impact of Inclusion Versus Postponement in Northern Ireland 
     It is vital to recognize that even at the end of the peace process the two ethnic groups had 
not settled their disagreement over Northern Ireland‟s ultimate sovereign status. Ulster 
Protestants will continue to seek the maintenance of the province‟s status as part of the 
United Kingdom and Irish Catholics will continue to pursue Irish unification. However, the 
cause of the Troubles, the unequal distribution of power between the two communities within 
Northern Ireland, has been rectified, allowing the violence to be brought to a sustainable end. 
In order to determine if the postponement of a permanent solution to Northern Ireland‟s 
sovereign status did indeed enable a negotiated agreement, I will assess what would have 
occurred in the counterfactual scenario that the parties agreed that a negotiated agreement 
must include a permanent resolution of this issue. 
     Five options for permanently resolving the sovereign status of Northern Ireland were 
advocated by politicians and academics during the Troubles. The first option was for 
Northern Ireland to be permanently integrated into the United Kingdom, either with or 
without devolution. Although Ulster Protestants clearly favored this option, it would not have 
been acceptable to Catholics, especially republicans, because the possibility of a united 
Ireland would disappear.
323
 
     The second option would have been for Northern Ireland to be permanently integrated 
into the Republic of Ireland. Under Irish sovereignty, Northern Ireland could also have been 
autonomous or treated the same as anywhere in the South. Although this option would have 
been preferred by Irish Catholics in the North and the Republic, as well as amongst many 
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Britons on the mainland, Ulster Protestants clearly were strongly against Irish unification as 
it would have meant an end to the Union. Therefore, a negotiated settlement between the 
parties in Northern Ireland could not have resulted in this outcome.
324
 
     The third option would have been a repartition of Ireland, with a smaller, more ethnically 
homogeneous Protestant Northern Ireland being permanently integrated into the United 
Kingdom, and the remainder of the island being the Republic of Ireland. The logic behind 
this option was to separate the ethnic antagonists from one another more effectively than was 
done with the original partition of Ireland.
325
 Due to the intermixed nature of the two 
communities in Northern Ireland, it would have been impossible to divide the island into two 
contiguous parts without considerable population transfers. Therefore, partition would have 
been unacceptable for practical reasons. Even if it were practical though, partition would not 
have been an acceptable option due to the content of Irish Catholic identity. While partition 
would have upheld the Union, albeit with a smaller Ulster, and thus would not have disrupted 
the content of Ulster Protestant identity, it would have ensured that a united Ireland would 
never be achieved, thus violating this central value of Irish Catholic identity. 
     The fourth option would have been an independent Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland 
would have become a state, permanently divorced from both the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland. This option had been discussed by politicians and scholars throughout 
the British Isles.
326
 Northern Ireland statehood would have been rejected by both Ulster 
Protestants and Irish Catholics though, as the Union would have ceased to exist and the 
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possibility of Irish unity would have disappeared. This possibility would have therefore 
violated the central identity-based values of both parties. 
     The final option that had been discussed was a system of shared sovereignty for Northern 
Ireland. Under this scenario, responsibility for Northern Ireland would have been shared 
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
327
 While perhaps this would have 
been the most stable permanent solution for Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status as both 
communities would have been protected by their preferred state, significant opposition would 
have existed on both sides that would have prevented negotiated agreement on this outcome. 
Ireland would not have been united under Irish sovereignty, and therefore republicans would 
have strongly resisted this solution. As we saw, Ulster Protestants found the relatively minor 
cross-border institutions of Strand Two difficult to accept; they surely would have strongly 
rejected a solution in which the Republic shared sovereignty. In fact, the most outspoken 
proponents of the shared sovereignty model openly recognized that it would not have been 
possible to gain majority approval for the plan amongst Northern Ireland‟s people and 
suggested that it simply be imposed by the British and Irish governments.
328
 Therefore, 
shared sovereignty was not a negotiated solution, at least not between Northern Ireland‟s two 
communities. 
     In sum, all five of the possible options for a permanent resolution of Northern Ireland‟s 
sovereign status would have been unacceptable to Ulster Protestants, Irish Catholics, or both 
communities. Polling conducted with regard to these five options supports this conclusion.
329
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a negotiated agreement to the Northern Ireland 
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conflict would not have been reached if a permanent resolution of Northern Ireland‟s 
sovereign status was considered a necessary component of the negotiation formula. It can 
then be concluded that the postponement of this issue through mutual acceptance of the 
consent principle enabled a negotiated agreement to be reached in Northern Ireland. 
     By leaving the question of Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status in limbo, each community 
was able to uphold the content of their ethnic identity intact. Ulster Protestants could be 
satisfied because the Union would remain in place for the foreseeable future. Irish Catholics 
could also accept this formula as it did not ask them to concede their hopes for Irish 
unification in the future. The higher Catholic birthrate gave them reason to believe that they 
would one day become the majority in Northern Ireland and therefore may eventually be able 
to achieve Irish unification through democratic means. 
     The decision that cross-border institutions had to be created as part of an agreement did 
increase Ulster Protestant fears about an erosion of the Union though. The large discrepancy 
between Protestant and Catholic approval rates of the Good Friday Agreement in the 
referendum indicates that omitting this issue from the formula could have dramatically 
lessened these fears while achieving broader overall approval. But at the same time, it is 
doubtful that republican approval would have been nearly as high with this issue omitted, so 
it may have been necessary in order to end the violent conflict. It is difficult to criticize a 
formula that ended up being successful, but it does appear that some of the difficulty that was 
removed by postponing permanent resolution of Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status was 
reinserted by seeking to establish all-Ireland institutions. 
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Comparison of the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland Negotiations 
     Besides the difference of including for permanent resolution versus postponing issues that 
required violating central identity-based values from the negotiation formula, there were 
other important differences between the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland negotiation 
processes. The spoiler violence that occurred during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was 
far more significant and damaging than what was seen in Northern Ireland. Whereas the 
United States played a productive role as a mediator in Northern Ireland by compensating for 
the relative weakness of the Northern nationalists, American mediation was 
counterproductive in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in that its partisan approach added to 
Israel‟s strength.330 The cooperation of outside actors also contributed to the resolution of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, as Britain and Ireland played productive roles, and external support 
for partisan militias was limited. In contrast, Iran played an important role in supporting 
Palestinian terrorism and American aid contributed to Israeli settlement growth, both of 
which had a highly negative effect on the peace process.
331
 In sum, these factors made 
success more likely in Northern Ireland than in Israel-Palestine. 
     But despite these factors, my analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations revealed that 
it was still very likely that a Palestinian state would have been created and the cause of 
violence removed if the issues of Jerusalem‟s holy sites and Palestinian refugees were set 
aside until after statehood was achieved. The difference between the parties regarding the 
territorial partition of Israel-Palestine was miniscule, and it is reasonable to believe that an 
agreement would have been reached had the negotiations focused on this issue. The Israeli 
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Labor Party‟s most vital coalition partner, Shas, was fully willing to support this outcome, as 
was a clear majority of the Israeli people.
332
 However, the inclusion of Jerusalem on the 
negotiation agenda led to the defection of Shas and Israeli opposition to Barak‟s concessions 
at Camp David. Palestinian support for a two-state solution also appeared to be sufficient, but 
their positions on Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees made agreement impossible with a 
sufficient Israeli coalition. 
     Despite all the positive factors working in favor of the Northern Ireland negotiations, my 
analysis revealed that had a permanent resolution of Northern Ireland‟s sovereign status been 
made a necessary component of an agreement during the formula development phase, the 
negotiation process would have ended in failure. It was only because the issue was postponed 
into the future through adoption of the consent principle that negotiated success was possible. 
     In sum, the inclusion for permanent resolution of issues that required compromise on 
values central to the identities of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians was critical to the failure of 
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process. The postponement of the issue that required 
compromise on values central to the identities of Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants was 
equally critical to the success of the Northern Ireland negotiations. The hypothesis that 
inclusion for permanent resolution versus postponement of conflicting identity-based issues 
affects the outcome of civil conflict negotiations is therefore supported.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
     This thesis sought to determine what the most successful negotiating approach is when 
dealing with issues that involve values central to the identities of ethnic civil conflict 
participants. The current scholarly literature addressing the negotiated resolution of ethnic 
civil conflict either ignores the importance of the content of ethnic identity, or alternatively 
assumes that conflicting ethnic values cause violent conflict to occur. In the latter case, it is 
recommended that ethnic antagonists exchange concessions on values central to their 
identities, reframe the discussion on sacred ethnic values, or utilize reconciliation initiatives. 
As the key to conflict resolution is inherently linked to the cause of conflict, it is essential to 
properly assess the cause of a particular conflict before designing a solution. The critical flaw 
of the literature that assigns blame to the content of ethnic identity is that it provides 
insufficient evidence that this is indeed the culprit. 
     Therefore, in order to determine the best approach for dealing with contradictory ethnic 
narratives in civil conflict negotiations I first had to determine the impact that identity-based 
values have on the outbreak of violent civil conflict. I selected two cases, the Israeli-
Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts. Because negotiations were undertaken following 
the stalemates that resulted from the Intifada and the Troubles respectively, I sought to 
determine what caused the Intifada and the Troubles to occur. Rather than the ethnic values 
of the antagonists, the best explanation for both of these conflicts was the highly unequal 
distribution of power between the groups in these divided societies. This was therefore the 
key problem that needed to be addressed, not their ethnic narratives. 
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     As these two case studies did not support the conclusion that it is necessary to alter central 
identity-based values in order to end violent civil conflict, I asked whether the inclusion for 
permanent resolution versus postponement of issues that involve values central to the parties‟ 
ethnic identities from the negotiation agenda during the formula development stage affects 
the outcome of negotiation processes. I utilized the counterfactual approach on analyses of 
the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland negotiation processes, and then compared the two 
cases to each other. My findings supported the conclusion that the most practical and 
successful way to effectively end violent civil conflict in cases where conflicting ethnic 
narratives are involved is simply to postpone issues that would require either or both parties 
to concede values central to their identities. 
     The key to consider when deciding which identity-based issues to include for permanent 
resolution in a negotiation formula and which to postpone is whether inclusion would prevent 
adequate support from the public or governing parties in the negotiation of details phase, as 
such support is necessary in order for the negotiation process to succeed.
333
 It is certainly not 
necessary to obtain the support of the entire public, but the mainstream of each side must be 
included and those in the opposition need to be isolated. It is important to not attempt to 
isolate the mainstream of either side, as this will certainly result in the continuation of the 
violent conflict.
334
 Therefore, attempts to force concessions on identity-based issues that 
would result in the alienation of the mainstream of either public, such as on the continued 
existence of the Union or the eventual unity of Ireland in the Northern Ireland case or on 
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Jerusalem or the right of return in the Israeli-Palestinian case, must be avoided if at all 
possible. 
     There are certainly dangers to attempting to violate the deeply held identity-based values 
of even relatively small minorities though. Although these dissenters may not be able to 
prevent concessions democratically, they often try to derail the negotiation process through 
violent means.
335
 This was clearly seen amongst spoilers on both sides during the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, and the consequences were disastrous. Therefore, it may be wise 
to avoid violating the identity-based values of even significant minorities if this would not 
prohibit the construction of an agreement that would address the essential issues. If it is 
necessary to violate these values in order to reach a useful agreement, as was the case with 
the religious-Zionist value of maintaining Jewish control over the entire West Bank, there is 
apparently no alternative to confronting this minority as best as is possible. 
     As this thesis examined only two cases, it would be useful in the future for scholars to test 
my hypotheses on all relevant cases in order to determine if my conclusions are indeed valid. 
But judging based upon this limited sample, it appears that those who have identified the 
content of ethnic identity as a cause of violent civil conflict may have been mistaken. As a 
consequence, negotiators, mediators, and conflict scholars may want to consider the virtues 
of postponing the permanent resolution of these most sensitive issues until after the true 
cause of ethnic civil conflict is addressed.  
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